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INTRODUCTION 
In immigration, habeas corpus has often been contested terrain.1 One sa-
lient example is expedited removal under the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA), which provides for removal without a full hearing before an im-
migration judge (IJ) and severely limited judicial review.2 Two recent devel-
opments have made the contours of habeas corpus in expedited removal even 
more acute. In Thuraissigiam v. Dep’t of Homeland Security,3 the Ninth 
Circuit recently held that the expedited removal provision’s limits on habeas 
corpus violated the Suspension Clause. Even more recently, the Acting 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a notice 
expanding the use of expedited removal to the statutory limit hitherto not 
reached, covering any foreign national whom DHS regards as inadmissible4 
who cannot show that she has been in the United States for at least two 
years.5 
1. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 304–15 (2001) (holding that provisions of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) which purported to limit judicial review 
of removal decisions did not bar the access of a lawful permanent resident (LPR) to habeas corpus to chal-
lenge his removal); Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 234–35 (1953) (reading an immigration statute as 
permitting habeas petitions by foreign nationals who had entered the United States, as the statute made 
agency determination on deportation final “except insofar as it was required by the Constitution”). 
2. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III) (2012) (providing for brief review by an IJ of an adverse 
determination by an asylum officer within 24 hours if practicable, and in all cases within 7 days); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(e)(2) (2012) (limiting habeas corpus to determinations of whether the petitioner is a U.S. citizen, 
lawful permanent resident (LPR), or person who has already been granted asylum or refugee status). 
3. Thuraissigiam v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 917 F.3d 1097 (2019), cert. granted, No. 19-161, 
2019 U.S. LEXIS 6487, 2019 WL 5281289 (Oct. 18, 2019). 
4. The statute ties expedited removal to inadmissibility on the grounds that the foreign national 
whom the government seeks to remove either lacks a visa authorizing admission to the United States or 
has engaged in misrepresentation in the course of seeking to enter the country. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7) 
(2012) (providing that a foreign national seeking to enter without a visa is inadmissible); 8 U.S.C. § 1182 
(a)(6)(C) (2012) (providing that a foreign national who engages in misrepresentation in the course of 
seeking admission is inadmissible). 
5. Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 84 Fed. Reg. 35, 409 (July 23, 2019) [hereinafter 
DHS Expansion Notice]. The INA expressly provides this authority. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) 
(2012). However, the federal government has traditionally imposed tight limits on expedited removal that 
permitted its use only within 100 air miles of a border and when a foreign national cannot prove she has 
been in the country for at least 14 days. See id. Courts considering the legality of expedited removal under 
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In a setting where courts have traditionally accepted the absence of judicial 
review, the Ninth Circuit decision would apply a robust conception of the 
Suspension Clause. In contrast, where courts have assumed its validity, 
DHS’s expansion of expedited review would curtail judicial review. 
This Article argues that both the Ninth Circuit and the DHS expansion 
notice miss the mark. The Ninth Circuit uncoupled the Suspension Clause 
from due process,6 as well as the Supreme Court’s procedural due process 
balancing test.7 That failure to consider habeas against the backdrop of rights 
and the balancing of government interests, private interests, and the risk of 
error lent an abstract tone to an inquiry that should be intensely practical.8 
While the Ninth Circuit correctly concluded that restrictions on habeas in the 
INA’s expedited removal provision violate the Suspension Clause, the 
Thuraissigiam court’s vision of what the Suspension Clause requires was too 
broad and unduly discounted the government’s legitimate interest in barring 
the admission of prospective entrants without prior ties to the United States.9 
Any standard addressing the “practical necessities”10 of governance needs to 
be more attuned to government interests, even if that standard exceeds the 
cramped judicial review that Congress has provided for expedited removal. 
The DHS expansion of expedited removal is a handy bookend for 
Thuraissigiam’s unduly broad vision, since DHS has wholly failed to address 
the long tradition of making habeas relief available to foreign nationals who 
have already entered the United States.11 The breadth and scope of this tradi-
tion of judicial review do not turn on whether the foreign national entered the 
United States legally. Here, too, the Supreme Court has recognized a link 
between the availability of habeas and the possession of due process rights.12 
the prior administrative limits upheld the statute. See, e.g., Shunaula v. Holder, 732 F.3d 143, 144 (2d Cir. 
2013); Khan v. Holder, 608 F.3d 325, 326 (7th Cir. 2010). 
6. See Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1111. 
7. See id. at 1110–12; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 
8. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 766 (2008) (finding that Guantanamo detainees have 
access to habeas corpus to test the legality of their detention, and noting that “practical obstacles” to 
deciding whether to grant the writ are a key concern); see also id. at 761 (discussing the importance of 
weighing “practical necessities” in determining scope of rights (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 
(1957) (Harlan, J., concurring))). Cf. id. at 802 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the Boumediene 
majority’s analysis was incomplete because it did not resolve the question of detainees’ constitutional 
right to due process, and arguing that “[h]abeas is most fundamentally a procedural right”); id. at 813 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (characterizing the Boumediene majority’s statement that “common-law ha-
beas corpus was, above all, an adaptable remedy . . . [whose] precise application and scope changed 
depending upon the circumstances” as an acknowledgment that habeas is “a flexible remedy rather than a 
substantive right”). 
9. See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 (2017) (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 
787, 792, 794 (1977)). 
10. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 759. 
11. See, e.g., Hansen v. Haff, 291 U.S. 559, 562–63 (1934); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 44 (1924); 
Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 101–02 (1903) (holding that the execu-
tive lacks the power to “to arbitrarily cause an alien who has entered the country, and has become subject 
in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its population, although alleged to be illegally here, to be 
taken into custody and deported without giving him all opportunity to be heard upon the questions involv-
ing his right to be and remain in the United States,” but then finding that the petitioner had in fact been 
granted this opportunity by the executive (emphasis added)). 
12. See Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 101–02. 
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However, the rigor of the standard of review in habeas cases involving 
entrants to the United States varies according to the precise content of the 
process due. 
Both the Ninth Circuit in Thuraissigiam and the DHS expansion notice 
limit habeas in immigration cases to one of two modes: either error- 
correction—the Ninth Circuit’s approach—or nonreviewability, which DHS 
champions. Error-correction in entrant immigration cases allows courts to 
address questions of law, including whether a provision in the INA is retro-
active.13 There is also precedent for judicial review of mixed questions of 
law and fact, such as whether a particular ground for removal fits an 
entrant’s conduct.14 In immigration cases, judicial review of pure questions 
of fact is uncommon.15 In the somewhat different context of habeas for 
detainees confined by the United States at Guantanamo, the Supreme Court 
has extended error-correction to mere questions of fact, such as whether a 
detainee had engaged in certain conduct in Afghanistan.16 In contrast, nonre-
viewability allows virtually no judicial review for questions of law, mixed 
questions of law and fact, or mere questions of fact.17 
This Article makes three key points about how the error-correction and 
nonreviewability typologies affect admission and entrant cases, respec-
tively. First, ascertaining the scope of the Suspension Clause inevitably 
requires addressing the process that is due to each group. Second, parsing 
due process’s requirements, in admission cases neither the error 
13. Congress, in an effort to confine judicial review of certain claims by entrants to the constitutional 
minimum after the Supreme Court’s decision to allow judicial review in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 
(2001), enacted a provision as part of the Real ID Act to expressly authorize “review of constitutional 
claims or questions of law” in cases outside the more truncated contours of expedited review. See 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)(D) (2012). This Article uses the term “error-correction” to contrast this mode of 
review under habeas with the nonreviewability that has traditionally governed admission cases. See infra 
notes 105–09 and accompanying text. Error-correction in this mode is not a remedy for every conceivable 
error in a decision. But it is a remedy for errors of law and, in some cases, errors of mixed law and fact 
and simple errors of fact. 
14. See Hansen, 291 U.S. at 562–63 (holding that the petitioner had not entered the country “for the 
purpose of prostitution or for any other immoral purpose” under the INA and was therefore not 
deportable). 
15. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 306 (noting that in entrant immigration cases, apart from some cases 
reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting removal, the courts “generally did not review 
factual determinations”). The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in a case concerning the judi-
cial review of facts in applications for withholding of removal. See Nasrallah v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 762 Fed. 
App’x. 638, 644 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing two prior Eleventh Circuit decisions, Cole v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
712 F.3d 517, 533 (11th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 826 (2013) and Keungne v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
561 F.3d 1281, 1283 (11th Cir. 2019), in holding that it had no jurisdiction to review questions of fact, 
only questions of law), cert. granted sub nom. Nasrallah v. Barr, No. 18-1432, 205 L. Ed. 2d 244 (2019). 
16. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 786 (holding that in Guantanamo cases, a court “must 
have the means to correct errors” that occurred in administrative proceedings, including the power to 
“consider exculpatory evidence” that the detainee had not introduced in administrative proceedings). But 
see id. at 814–16 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting that it is generally rare to review questions of fact 
in habeas cases, and that the majority read habeas requirements too broadly). 
17. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 211 (1953) (asserting that in 
admission cases, “it is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized by law, to review 
the determination of the political branch of the government” (citing United States ex rel. Knauff v. 
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950))). 
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correction nor nonreviewability paradigms fit. Instead, the Article 
invokes a middle ground shaped by precedent on extradition and custody 
transfer, which provides review that ensures independence, absence of ar-
bitrary decision-making, and fundamental fairness, but is more deferen-
tial than the error-correction approach. The Article calls this middle 
ground “inquisitorial integrity.” Third, the Article argues that error- 
correction is the appropriate standard in entrant cases, because of 
entrants’ domestic ties. 
While both the Ninth Circuit in Thuraissigiam and the DHS expedited 
removal expansion notice seek in different ways to make due process irrel-
evant, habeas and due process are inherently conjoined. In assessing the 
availability of habeas and the relevant standard of review, the Supreme 
Court’s test for procedural due process in Mathews v. Eldridge should gov-
ern.18 Under Mathews, the Court considers the interest of the individual, 
the interest of the government, and the risk of error posed by current proce-
dures.19 While the Supreme Court has asserted in multiple cases that an 
individual seeking admission to the United States is requesting a privilege, 
not enforcing a right,20 that view underestimates the interests of persons 
who need a haven from persecution, which can include arrest, torture, or 
death. A person with a well-founded fear of persecution abroad has a 
strong interest in reducing that risk. That should make a difference for 
habeas. 
Mathews also requires a court to consider the government’s interest in 
an efficient system for removing inadmissible foreign nationals, includ-
ing those without meritorious asylum claims.21 As the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed recently, “the admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is 
a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s 
18. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). Compare Thuraissigiam v. Dep’t of 
Homeland Security, 917 F.3d 1097, 1111 (9th Cir. 2019) (rejecting any necessary connection between ha-
beas and due process), with Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 835 F.3d 422, 442–44 (3d Cir. 
2016) (holding that the lack of due process protections in admission cases also meant that the Suspension 
Clause did not bar Congress from limiting judicial review in that context). See also Gerald L. Neuman, 
Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 1052–57 
(1998) (acknowledging a potential inconsistency between the author’s robust view of habeas in admission 
cases and the conventional view that due process does not apply, and urging revision of the conventional 
view; but, ultimately, reading the Suspension Clause as an independent source of access to judicial review 
of admission decisions). But see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Applying the Suspension Clause to Immigration 
Cases, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1068, 1078–79 (1998) (suggesting that the availability of habeas must be 
linked to other constitutional provisions, such as Article III and due process). 
19. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35. Along with the risk of error, courts should also consider the 
value of additional safeguards in reducing the risk of error. Id. at 335. 
20. See Landon v. Placencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (listing cases). 
21. The legal standard for asylum is difficult to meet, because the claimant must not only show a 
“well-founded fear of persecution,” but must also show that such persecution has a demonstrable nexus to 
“race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(42) (2012). Proving nexus can be challenging. See, e.g., INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 
(1992) (holding that an asylum claimant had not established a nexus between the risk of harm and a politi-
cal opinion in alleging that a guerilla group in Guatemala had threatened to retaliate against him and his 
family if he did not join the group). 
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political departments largely immune from judicial control.”22 Protracted 
stays in the United States by persons without colorable claims for asylum 
or other bases for admissibility would vitiate this aspect of sovereignty. 
Streamlined procedures can help the government manage sudden spikes 
in flows of inadmissible foreign nationals.23 Those flows stem from both 
“push” and “pull” factors. In recent years, climate change, violence, and 
economic hardship have been major push factors, prompting a sharp 
increase in attempted border crossings.24 
See Matthew Lorenzen, The Mixed Motives of Unaccompanied Child Migrants from Central 
America’s Northern Triangle, 5 J. MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 744, 749–54 (2017) (discussing the range of 
reasons driving Central American migration); DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., MIGRATION POL’Y INST., THE 
U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM IN CRISIS: CHARTING A WAY FORWARD 5 (2018), available at https://www. 
migrationpolicy.org/research/us-asylum-system-crisis-charting-way-forward (same). 
In addition to the safety and 
economic opportunity available in the United States, U.S. immigration 
law and procedure constitute important pull factors. Informed by smug-
gling networks acting with entrepreneurial zeal,25 
VICTORIA A. GREENFIELD ET AL., HOMELAND SECURITY OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS CENTER, 
HUMAN SMUGGLING AND ASSOCIATED REVENUES: WHAT DO OR CAN WE KNOW ABOUT ROUTES FROM 
CENTRAL AMERICA TO THE UNITED STATES 10–14 (2019), available at https://www.rand.org/pubs/ 
research_reports/RR2852.html (noting that smugglers work in a range of configurations, including 
individual guides for separate parts of the journey to the United States, loose networks, and—more rarely— 
highly organized groups; they often identify and recruit prospective border crossers). 
prospective entrants 
look for openings that U.S. law provides. One such opportunity arises 
from long delays in U.S. asylum adjudication that enable asylum appli-
cants to remain in the United States and work legally. Such delays raise 
incentives to enter the country and claim asylum.26 The government can 
reasonably claim that it needs some latitude in tailoring procedural rules 
to prevent abuse of the asylum system. 
The third Mathews factor—the risk of error—is harder to parse in this con-
text. The haste and volume of expedited removal can produce errors, particu-
larly when legal counsel for applicants is scarce.27 Moreover, IJs may not 
always correct initial errors caused by the compressed time frame of expe-
dited removal, in part because IJ quality varies widely. The varied quality of 
IJs has prompted criticism from appellate courts even in non-expedited  
22. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418 (2018). 
23. See S. Rep. No. 104-249, at 7 (1996) (noting, in the course of passing the Illegal Immigration 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), that foreign nationals “who violate U.S. immi-
gration law should be removed from this country as soon as possible”); see also David A. Martin, 
Two Cheers for Expedited Removal in the New Immigration Laws, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 673, 684–85 
(2000) (suggesting that robust border enforcement that efficiently removes foreign nationals who 
lack a credible fear of persecution in their home country will ease the “revolving door” through which 
persons who are not admissible repeatedly seek to cross the border); Peter H. Schuck, INS Detention 
and Removal: A White Paper, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667, 669 (1997) (noting Congress’s view, mani-




26. See MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 24, at 4. 
27. Stephen Manning & Kari Hong, Getting It Righted: Access to Counsel in Rapid Removals, 101 
MARQUETTE L. REV. 673, 679 (2018). 
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removal cases with full IJ hearings.28 In Thuraissigiam, the Ninth Circuit ech-
oed this critique.29 But the critique of IJs does not fully align with opposition 
to expedited removal. As part of the expedited removal process, border offi-
cials refer applicants to asylum officers for credible fear interviews. Asylum 
officers are not IJs, and credible fear interviews do not feature the procedural 
formality of immigration court. Nevertheless, in credible fear interviews, 
positive findings substantially outnumber adverse decisions.30 
See ASYLUM DIV., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. (USCIS), CREDIBLE FEAR 
WORKLOAD REPORT SUMMARY: FY 2018 TOTAL CASELOAD (2018) [hereinafter USCIS CREDIBLE FEAR 
WORKLOAD REPORT SUMMARY FY 2018: TOTAL CASELOAD], available at https://www.uscis.gov/sites/ 
default/files/USCIS/Outreach/PED_CFandRFstats09302018.pdf (noting that asylum officers made 
positive credible fear findings in the overwhelming majority of cases in which they conducted 
interviews). 
Trained asy-
lum officers’ tendency to find credible fear shows that the informality of asy-
lum interviews does not necessarily increase the risk of error. 
Reconciling the Mathews factors, this Article argues that habeas should be 
available in admission cases involving an alleged risk of persecution, but in a 
more modest form than the Ninth Circuit envisioned in Thuraissigiam. The 
error-correction approach suggested by the Ninth Circuit failed to address the 
government’s interest in easing the pull factors that drive unauthorized immi-
gration. To accommodate that interest, this Article proposes a new standard— 
inquisitorial integrity—drawn from an early immigration opinion by Justice 
Holmes31 and cases on extradition and international custody transfers.32 
As in the extradition cases, expedited removal contemplates inquisitorial 
proceedings, in which the decisionmaker asks questions and solicits evi-
dence.33 Historically, many administrative immigration decisions, including 
those by line-level immigration inspectors or commissioners, have been 
inquisitorial.34 In the extradition context, those conducting inquisitorial pro-
ceedings historically were magistrates appointed by the courts and thus inde-
pendent of the executive branch.35 In addition to independence, integrity—a 
28. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 295, 311 (2007); see also Chavarria-Reyes v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 278, 280 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, 
J., dissenting) (asserting that “the Immigration Court . . . is the least competent federal agency . . . it may 
well owe its dismal status to its severe underfunding by Congress, which has resulted in a shortage of im-
migration judges that has subjected them to crushing workloads”). 
29. See Thuraissigiam v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 917 F.3d 1097, 1113 n.18 (2019) (discussing 
the shortcomings of the asylum interview process). 
30.
31. See Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3, 9 (1915); see also Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive 
Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, supra note 18, at 105 (discussing Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3 
(1915)); Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration Act, 113 HARV. 
L. REV. 1963, 1967–68 (2000) (same). 
32. See generally Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008); Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957); 
Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902); Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502 (1896); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 
(1891); In re Stupp, 23 F. Cas. 296 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875). 
33. See Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure Due Process, and the 
Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1194–95 (2005). 
34. See Christen Chapman, Developments in the Law: Immigration Reform: Relief From 
Deportation: An Unnecessary Battle, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1529, 1538–39 (2011). 
35. See In re Kaine, 14 F. Cas. 84, 88, 92 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1852) (discussing the manner of appointing 
commissioners who presided over extradition hearings), writ dismissed on other grounds, 55 U.S. 103 
(1853). 
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good-faith effort to address the issue identified under the relevant statute— 
was a key element in such proceedings.36 
These core concepts of independence and integrity are also relevant to ju-
dicial review of credible fear findings. The reviewing court should vacate and 
remand removal orders in cases where the IJ reviewing the asylum officer’s 
credible fear denial has failed to compile a summary and analysis of find-
ings.37 In addition, the reviewing court should ensure that the applicant had 
an interpreter, as the regulations require.38 Moreover, the court should inquire 
whether the IJ blocked the claimant’s ability to confer with counsel, assum-
ing that the claimant could obtain counsel within the seven-day deadline pro-
vided for IJ review under expedited removal.39 Finally, the reviewing court 
should assess the IJ’s asylum decision under a plain error standard.40 
This standard is deferential. It consciously avoids inquiry into the weight 
of the evidence, which should be the province of decisionmakers below. 
However, the inquisitorial integrity standard does establish a baseline of in-
dependence, integrity, and fairness that checks arbitrary decisions and mod-
els a focused inquiry on the task at hand. 
If inquisitorial integrity is the appropriate standard in admission cases, 
error-correction is the appropriate standard for the entrants affected by the 
DHS expansion notice. First, consider the individual’s interest. As even the 
DHS expansion notice observed,41 foreign nationals who have resided in 
the United States may well have developed “substantial connections” to this 
country, including immediate relatives.42 Despite the diligence of most asy-
lum officers, the haste that Congress hard-wired into expedited removal will 
impede entrants’ efforts to seek relief.43 The diligence of most asylum offi-
cers can compensate to some degree for the process’s harsh deadlines, but 
some errors will evade notice. 
By comparison, the government’s interest is somewhat less weighty in this 
context. As in the case of admission, the government has a significant interest 
36. Consistent with this value, the expedited review provision of the INA already requires that asy-
lum officers considering whether a prospective entrant has a “credible fear” of persecution compile a 
“summary of . . . material facts” and an “analysis” of how the facts fit the credible fear standard. See 8 
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(II) (2012). 
37. Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.42(b)–(d) (2018), the IJ must receive all “material and relevant evidence,” 
provide an interpreter and make a de novo determination of whether there is a “significant possibility” 
that the applicant may qualify for asylum. However, the regulations do not specifically require written 
findings from the IJ. See id. 
38. See id. § 1003.42(c). 
39. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III) (2012). 
40. See Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502, 509 (1896). 
41. See DHS Expansion Notice, supra note 5, at 12. 
42. See Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 101–02 (1903) (holding 
that due process protects a foreign entrant to a country who has “become . . . a part of its population”); see 
also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process, and “Community Ties”: A Response to Martin, 44 
U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 242 (1983) (describing the argument that certain entrants have—along with U.S. 
citizens—“mutual obligations” that “arise because of physical proximity and a sense of sharing in a com-
mon enterprise”). 
43. Under the INA, a foreign national must apply for asylum within one year of entering the United 
States. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2012). 
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in the timely removal of foreign nationals who were inadmissible at the time 
of their entry into the United States and who at the time of their apprehension 
still lack a legal basis for remaining here. But the removal of foreign nation-
als from the interior lacks the exigent element of managing a border surge. 
Moreover, the government’s interest is discounted by the collateral effects of 
enforcement on U.S. citizen relatives of the entrant. This factor does not neg-
ate legal arguments for removal in specific cases. However, the need for 
deliberation in mitigating impacts like the separation of children from parents 
dilutes the need for speed in interior enforcement. For all of these reasons, an 
error-correction standard is most appropriate for the review of expanded 
expedited removal. As applied to this expanded setting, the limitations on ju-
dicial review of expedited removal violate the Suspension Clause, requiring 
federal courts to fill the gap with habeas. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I discusses expedited removal, 
both in the admissions context and in the expansion just implemented by 
DHS. Part II discusses the visions of judicial review relevant to expedited re-
moval, including nonreviewability, error-correction, and inquisitorial integ-
rity. This Part argues that an account of habeas’ availability and scope of 
review also requires a vision of substantive constitutional rights, including the 
due process balancing approach of Mathews v. Eldridge. Part III explains why 
the application of the Mathews factors favors the inquisitorial integrity 
approach for admission cases and the error-correction model for expanded 
expedited removal. That differential approach best fits the values that due pro-
cess balancing seeks to vindicate. It therefore also provides the most practical 
and persuasive account of the habeas remedy in expedited removal cases. 
I. EXPEDITED REMOVAL AT THE BORDER AND BEYOND 
To understand both the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Thuraissigiam and 
DHS’s expansion of expedited removal, it is useful to know more about the 
expedited review process. This Part aims to provide an outline of the statutory 
framework for this streamlined procedure, which relies on inquisitorial proce-
dures in place of the adversarial approach that characterizes the United States 
common law tradition. As we shall see, in general and with respect to immigra-
tion law, an inquisitorial approach has both risks and benefits. DHS’s expan-
sion of expedited removal compounds the risks of the inquisitorial approach. 
A. The Statutory Backdrop 
Congress enacted the expedited removal provisions of the INA in 1996 as 
part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA).44 Efforts to craft an expedited removal policy took shape because 
44. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2012); see also Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited Removal, supra note 
23, at 675–78 (discussing the development and passage of the legislation). 
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of discontent in Congress and the Clinton Administration with the prior pol-
icy for handling foreign nationals arriving at the southern border, by sea, and 
at other points of entry such as airports.45 Under the statutory framework then 
in place, foreign nationals arriving at these points without visas entitling 
them to admission to the United States would be arrested by immigration offi-
cers and then released if they sought asylum based on a fear of persecution.46 
After the individual alleged fear of persecution, immigration officials would 
typically release that person, pending a deportation proceeding at some future 
date in the Department of Justice’s administrative immigration court, where 
the foreign national respondent could assert her asylum claim as a defense to 
deportation.47 Both Congress and the Clinton Administration believed that 
this practice led to protracted stays in the United States by many individuals 
without a legal basis for permanently remaining in the country.48 Moreover, 
both legislators and administration officials believed that these protracted 
stays undermined the INA’s framework.49 In enacting expedited removal in 
1996, Congress substituted a more compressed and inquisitorial procedure to 
deal with inadmissible foreign nationals who could not prove to immigration 
officers that they had entered the United States at least two years prior to their 
arrest.50 
Under the statutory expedited removal provision, immigration officers 
anywhere in the country can summarily remove a foreign national who, (1) is 
inadmissible for lack of a valid visa, and, (2) cannot show at least two years 
of continuous physical presence in the United States, unless that foreign 
national indicates an intent to seek asylum or expresses a fear of persecution 
in her country of origin.51 At that point, the entrant receives a “credible fear” 
interview with a trained asylum officer from U.S. Citizenship and 
45. Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited Removal, supra note 23, at 676–77. 
46. Under longstanding immigration doctrine, courts will not view a foreign national stopped at the 
border or a port of entry as having “entered” the United States, even if the government subsequently 
detains that person within the country or provisionally releases the foreign national pending a subsequent 
removal hearing. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230–31 (1925) (Holmes, J.) (finding that a for-
eign national apprehended at the border, who was charged with being inadmissible due to mental infirmity 
and then consigned to the care of an immigrants’ aid society in the interior of the country, was “still in 
theory of law at the boundary line and had gained no foothold in the United States” (emphasis added)). 
The person apprehended in this fashion remains in the eyes of the law as merely being on the threshold of 
entry. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953) (noting that a foreign 
national arrested upon attempted entry in New York and detained there by immigration authorities has 
not effected an “entry” into the United States within the meaning of immigration law). Immigration schol-
ars refer to this doctrine as the “entry fiction.” See Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention 
of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 951–52 
(1995). In ordinary discourse, being physically present in a country would indicate that one has entered. 
Cf. id. (noting the “strained” character of entry fiction). But perhaps even more than other areas of law, 
immigration law has a doctrinal valence that, on occasion, departs from the ordinary discourse. See id. 
47. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2012) (discussing the procedure for what are now called removal hear-
ings before IJs). 
48. Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited Removal, supra note 23, at 676–77. 
49. Id. 
50. Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) (2012). 
51. Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited Removal, supra note 23, at 676–77; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) 
(2012). 
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Immigration Services (USCIS), a component of DHS.52 That interview usu-
ally occurs at a port of entry or another location designated by immigration 
officials within days or a few weeks of the foreign nationals’ arrest.53 If the 
asylum officer decides that the claimant has a “credible fear of persecution,” 
the claimant will receive a full immigration court hearing on a future date.54 
If the asylum officer decides that the claimant lacks a credible fear of per-
secution, the statute empowers the officer to enter an order of removal and 
prepare a written “summary of. . . material facts” and an analysis of how the 
facts fit the credible fear standard.55 The statute further provides that, upon 
the claimant’s request, an IJ will review the asylum officer’s determination, 
where practicable within twenty-four hours and no later than seven days after 
the decision was rendered.56 In the course of that IJ review, the IJ allows the 
claimant to be heard and allows the lawyer for the claimant to pose ques-
tions.57 If the IJ determines that the claimant has a credible fear, a full merits 
hearing will be scheduled in due course in immigration court, much as when 
the asylum officer made a favorable decision. If the IJ determines that the 
claimant does not have a credible fear, no further administrative review is 
available.58 
Congress also restricted judicial review of expedited removal orders.59 The 
INA provides that a constitutional challenge to the expedited review frame-
work must be brought in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
within sixty days of the effective date of the legislation.60 In addition, plain-
tiffs must follow the same narrow procedure for a statutory or constitutional 
challenge to any agency policy implementing the expedited review provi-
sion.61 Under the statute, judicial review of individual decisions is only 
52. Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited Removal, supra note 23, at 676–77; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A) 
(ii) (2012). 
53. Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited Removal, supra note 23, at 676–77; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B) 
(i) (2012). 
54. Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited Removal, supra note 23, at 676–77; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B) 
(ii) (2012). Before the hearing, immigration officials may grant the claimant parole or bond and release 
her. Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited Removal, supra note 23, at 676–77; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) 
(2012). Because of the current backlog of cases in immigration court, if the claimant is released, her mer-
its hearing will probably occur at least three years after her arrest. See MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 24, at 
15 (citing the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) “Immigration Court Backlog Tool”). 
Absent the granting of parole or bond, officials will detain the claimant pending her hearing. Id.; 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012). 
55. MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 24; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I)–(II) (2012). 
56. MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 24; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(i)(III) (2012). 
57. See MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 24. The IJ must create a “record” of the proceedings, conduct a 
de novo review of the credible fear issue, and furnish an interpreter for the claimant if one is necessary, 
but is not required to provide reasons for her decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.42(b), (c) (2018); see also Jennifer 
Lee Koh, When Shadow Removals Collide: Searching for Solutions to the Legal Black Holes Created By 
Expedited Removal and Reinstatement, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 338, 361–62 (2018) (discussing the expe-
dited removal process); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and the Role of 
Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 9–10 (2014) (same). 
58. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(C) (2012). 
59. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(C), 1252(e)(2) (2012). 
60. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(C), 1252(e)(3)(A)(i), (B) (2012). 
61. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(C), 1252(e)(3)(A)(ii), (B) (2012). 
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available under habeas corpus and may include only limited issues: 
(1) whether the petitioner is a U.S. citizen, lawful permanent resident (LPR), 
or the recipient of a previous asylum grant that the government has not yet 
terminated, and, (2) failing that, whether the petitioner was, in fact, ordered 
removed.62 In all but a tiny minority of cases, the facts will clearly satisfy 
prong (2) and the factors included in prong (1) will not apply, placing the pe-
titioner on a direct path to removal with no further federal judicial check on 
executive determinations. 
B. The July 2019 DHS Expedited Removal Expansion Notice 
The recent DHS expansion notice marks a material change in the govern-
ment’s implementation of the INA’s expedited removal provision. Until July 
2019, the government imposed tight limits on expedited removal that focused 
on arrests at or near a border or port of entry. Under these limits, DHS applied 
expedited removal procedures only, (1) within 100 air miles of a border, and, 
(2) when a foreign national could not prove she had been in the country for a 
short period: fourteen days.63 Any foreign national in the country for fourteen 
days or more was not subject to expedited removal. The July 2019 DHS 
notice expanded expedited removal up to the limits of the statute. As a result, 
an arrest by immigration officers will trigger expedited removal, at the discre-
tion of DHS, anywhere in the country, not just within 100 miles of a border. 
In addition, expedited removal will apply at DHS’s discretion to any appa-
rently inadmissible foreign national who cannot show “to the satisfaction of 
an immigration officer” that she has maintained a continuous physical pres-
ence in the United States for two or more years prior to her arrest.64 At that 
point, the compressed procedures of expedited removal, including restric-
tions on judicial review, would apply.65 
As a practical matter, the pre-expansion policy meant that Customs and 
Border Patrol (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
would use expedited removal only for people caught crossing the border or 
very close to it.66 In contrast, expanded removal will by its terms apply to a 
substantially larger group, given its nationwide scope and extended temporal 
criterion. Under the expansion, this much larger group—which could number 
in the hundreds of thousands—will often be deprived of a full hearing before 
an IJ and the time and legal assistance helpful to prepare and support an 
62. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(C), 1252(e)(2)(A)–(C) (2012). Congress expressly precluded “review 
of whether the alien is actually inadmissible or entitled to any relief from removal.” See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 
(b)(1)(C), 1252(e)(1)–(5) (2012). 
63. DHS Expansion Notice, supra note 5, at 5–6. 
64. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) (2012). 
65. Concerns about curbs on judicial review in immigration are not new. Almost seventy years ago, 
Professor Henry Hart cautioned about the problems with eliminating habeas corpus for entrants. See 
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in 
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1392 (1953) (noting that cutbacks in federal court immigration juris-
diction had “largely been confined to admission cases”). 
66. See Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 835 F.3d 422, 448 (3d Cir. 2016). 
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asylum claim. Under the pre-expansion policy, individuals arrested within 
the interior of the United States and those who entered the country at least 
fourteen days prior to arrest would receive a full removal hearing in immigra-
tion court. In some cases, known as “affirmative” asylum cases, noncitizens 
would apply for asylum to the office of USCIS within DHS, receive an inter-
view with an asylum officer, and then subsequently receive a full immigra-
tion court hearing if the asylum officer denied the noncitizen’s claim.67 In 
other cases, known as defensive asylum cases, a foreign national arrested by 
DHS within the country’s interior would be able to assert an asylum claim 
before an IJ and receive a full hearing on the claim at some point after the 
individual’s arrest, along with a reasonable time to seek legal counsel and 
prepare an asylum application.68 Moreover, most relevant to this Article, 
these individuals would be able to seek administrative review of a negative IJ 
decision in the Justice Department’s Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 
and then seek judicial review in a U.S. circuit court of appeals on questions 
of law.69 Under the DHS expansion, those safeguards will not be in place for 
the large group covered by the new policy. 
C. Benefits and Risks of Expedited Removal: Impacts and Error Rates 
Parsing the risks and virtues of expedited removal requires a careful look. 
In individual cases, the compressed procedures of expedited removal may 
prompt substantial costs and reduce the accuracy of decisions. That decrease 
in accuracy may be an even greater concern with DHS’s new expansion of 
the expedited removal process. A full assessment of expedited removal’s 
risks and benefits addresses both the types of errors in asylum proceedings 
and the relative virtues of inquisitorial and adversarial procedures in adjudi-
cating asylum cases. 
As with any other inquiry, errors come in two varieties: false positives and 
false negatives. For purposes of this Article, a false positive is a grant of asy-
lum to a claimant who actually does not meet the statutory standard.70 A false 
negative is a claimant who receives a denial but in fact does meet the statu-
tory standard. The government frames expedited removal as a means for min-
imizing both false positives and the time it takes to accurately separate the  
67. See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 28, at 305–06. 
68. In both the affirmative and defensive asylum contexts, a claimant must apply within one year of 
entry, absent a showing of changed or extraordinary circumstances that justify filing later. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(a)(2)(B), (D) (2012). 
69. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(2)(B), (D), 1252(a)(1)(D) (2012). 
70. One can apply the same terms in assessing stays of removal in non-expedited removal cases sub-
ject to judicial review under the INA. In the stay context, a false positive would be a case in which the cir-
cuit court grants a stay to facilitate further consideration of the case, but ultimately denies the appeal on 
the merits. A false negative would be a case in which the court declines to grant a stay, but the petitioner 
ultimately prevails on the merits. See Fatma Marouf et al., Justice on the Fly: The Danger of Errant 
Deportations, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 386–87 (2014). 
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wheat from the chaff in asylum claims.71 In contrast, for claimants and their 
advocates, expedited removal heightens the risk of false negatives, without 
winnowing out false positives.72 While the government views reduction in 
the time spent adjudicating cases as an independent good, claimants generally 
view additional time as positively correlated with accuracy and reduction in 
errors.73 Debates about errors play out against the backdrop of the INA.The 
INA reflects Congress’s concern about both false positives and false nega-
tives. The statute seeks to reduce false positives by requiring that applicants 
show a nexus between possible harm and one of the five bases for asylum: 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or politi-
cal opinion.74 Yet, in establishing “credible fear” of persecution as the thresh-
old for initial asylum screening, the INA sets the prevention of false 
negatives as the top priority. 
1. The INA and Error Rates 
The INA itself weighs false positives and false negatives in asylum asym-
metrically. In both initial screening and ultimate adjudication on the merits, 
Congress established standards that prioritize preventing false negatives.75 In 
other words, the INA’s provisions stress saving individuals from possible 
harm—including arrest, torture, or death—at the hands of their home coun-
try’s government or those whom the government is unwilling or unable to 
control. To protect these individuals, the INA’s provisions also tolerate initial 
and ultimate outcomes that entail false positives. The general theory includes 
consideration of the nature of the underlying harm at issue. As the Supreme 
Court has explained in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, the law endeavors to protect 
an individual from irreversible harm such as being “shot, tortured, or other-
wise persecuted.”76 To that end, a claimant can meet the INA’s “well- 
founded fear” of persecution standard merely by showing a ten percent 
chance of harm befalling her “on account of” one of the asylum provision’s 
five grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.77 
The INA’s screening criteria used by asylum officers at initial interviews 
reinforce this prioritization of protection from harm. The “credible fear of 
persecution” standard used in initial screenings, including those for expedited 
removal, is designed to filter out manifestly unfounded claims. A more 
demanding test would filter out too many colorable claims for asylum and 
71. See DHS Expansion Notice, supra note 5, at 9–10; Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited Removal, 
supra note 23, at 684–85. 
72. See Manning & Hong, supra note 27, at 679, 683. 
73. See Peter W. Billings, A Comparative Analysis of Administrative and Adjudicative Systems for 
Determining Asylum Claims, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 253, 255 (2000). 
74. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992). 
75. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987). 
76. Id. at 440. 
77. See id. 
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raise to unacceptable levels the risk of returning claimants to a country in 
which they could be “shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted”—the very out-
comes that the Supreme Court in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca said Congress 
wished to prevent. To reduce that risk, the INA provides that asylum officers 
find that a claimant has shown a credible fear of persecution if there is a “sig-
nificant possibility” that the claimant will subsequently be able to establish a 
well-founded fear.78 
2. Nexus as a Check on False Positives 
One aspect of asylum law acts as a brake on grants at the final adjudica-
tion stage and hence, to some degree, on credible fear findings during pre-
liminary screening: the requirement that a claimant must show a nexus 
between the persecution alleged and one of the five INA grounds. The like-
lihood of persecution—whether the risk rises to the ten percent threshold 
that the Supreme Court cited in Cardoza-Fonseca—is irrelevant, unless 
the claimant can demonstrate a nexus. As the Supreme Court indicated in 
INS v. Elias-Zacarias,79 it can be difficult to show such a link. 
For example, suppose a guerilla group threatens a farmer in Guatemala 
with retaliation if that individual does not join the group. According to the 
Court, an individual’s reluctance to join the group could be based on a range 
of factors, including fear of government forces who target the guerilla group 
or a desire to stay close to home and tend to the farm. 80 Justice Scalia, writing 
for the Court in Elias-Zacarias, found that an asylum claim was legally insuf-
ficient where the claimant could not demonstrate that the guerilla group 
would retaliate against him because of one of the five asylum grounds—here, 
political opinion—rather than one of the other factors noted above, which are 
not cognizable under the INA.81 The INA only requires the time and process 
reasonably necessary to determine that a future claimant is alleging facts sim-
ilar to those in Elias-Zacarias, which are legally insufficient for a grant of 
asylum. 
3. Fraud and Embellishment in Asylum Claims 
Another important fact should temper asylum grants even when facts 
alleged are legally sufficient. Information about conditions abroad can be dif-
ficult to obtain. That factor helps account for the ten percent standard of proof 
for asylum cases: a claimant may encounter challenges in finding information 
to document her claim, which often concerns events in a distant country with 
a despotic government. At the same time, the lack of access to accurate infor-
mation hampers adjudicators, who often find it difficult to verify the 
78. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) (2012). 
79. See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 482. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 482–84. 
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applicant’s claims.82 
See Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1923 (2017) (setting the standard for criminal prose-
cutions of false statements in naturalization, and describing an egregious misrepresentation in which an asylum 
applicant claimed her husband had been a victim of persecution when in fact he was a significant player in 
wartime atrocities); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-50, ASYLUM: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS 
NEEDED TO ASSESS AND ADDRESS FRAUD RISKS 3–4 (2015), available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/ 
673941.pdf; see also Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited Removal, supra note 23, at 184 (describing 
challenges of verifying information and incentives for claimants to embellish or misrepresent the facts). 
In a significant number of cases, applicants either 
embellish their claims or invent them outright.83 A system that cannot select 
out these invented claims invites an excessive number of false positives. 
These errors ultimately injure bona fide asylum seekers by fueling a backlash 
against even meritorious claims. 
D. Expedited Removal as an Inquisitorial System 
Expedited removal’s supporters and critics divide on whether it is fair and 
accurate to rely on a largely inquisitorial system, as expedited removal does. 
Critics favor a hybrid system which couples inquisitorial and adversarial 
phases with judicial review. That system covered interior immigration 
enforcement prior to DHS’s expansion of expedited removal. Addressing the 
propriety of a largely inquisitorial framework entails consideration of the 
inquisitorial and adversarial traditions, particularly with respect to immigra-
tion law. 
1. Inquisitorial Models and American Law 
Inquisitorial proceedings have a bad reputation in the common law world, 
but they are not necessarily unfair or inaccurate.84 An inquisitorial proceed-
ing, for purposes of this Article, is a relatively informal proceeding—at least 
compared with an adversarial judicial hearing—in which the decisionmaker 
examines witnesses, including the claimant or defendant. While a lawyer 
may be present, the lawyer will typically have a more modest role—one lim-
ited to preparing the party or witness for the examination, submitting appro-
priate evidence in writing either before the hearing or after if the examining 
officer so requests, and consulting with the claimant or clarifying facts for the 
record. This type of proceeding contrasts with the adversarial model, in 
82.
83. See Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited Removal, supra note 23, at 184. 
84. See Kessler, supra note 33, at 1258–60; John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil 
Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 827–29 (1985); Russell G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality in the 
Market for Justice: Why Access to Lawyers Will Never Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of 
Judges Will Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 969, 971 (2004) (noting that an inquisitorial system uses deci-
sionmakers to “manage and guide a process where the parties assist them in their search for justice . . . 
[i]nquisitorial judges conduct investigations, initiate cases, determine the issues, and control the presenta-
tion of evidence”); Chapman, supra note 34, at 1536. Cf. David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1680–81 (2009) (discussing the imprecision of the Supreme Court’s view of the 
inquisitorial approach in criminal procedure, but agreeing that the participation of the decisionmaker in 
the questioning of witnesses is a hallmark of the inquisitorial paradigm). A new breed of problem-solving 
courts addressing chemical dependency, housing, teen-against-teen violence, and other social issues also 
relies on inquisitorial techniques. See Jessica K. Steinberg, Informal, Inquisitorial, and Accurate: An 
Empirical Look at a Problem-Solving Housing Court, 42 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1058, 1063–68 (2017). 
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which each party has primary responsibility for questioning witnesses and 
the attorney’s role is more expansive. 
Although U.S. courts owe much to the common law tradition, our judi-
cial system leaves room for many inquisitorial elements. Courts have inter-
preted Article III of the U.S. Constitution to permit proceedings involving 
so-called “public rights” in agency settings run with inquisitorial proce-
dures.85 In addition, federal courts at one point conducted certain immigra-
tion-related inquisitorial proceedings, such as naturalization for legal 
residents who wished to become U.S. citizens.86 Moreover, courts of equity 
have always had a strong inquisitorial bent.87 In the development of courts 
of equity in England, chancellors who issued decisions frequently relied on 
masters who interviewed witnesses and prepared accounts of the wit-
nesses’ testimony.88 
The inquisitorial turn may provide a more conducive setting than the fraught 
arena of adversarial litigation for “calm recollection.”89 An interview—even 
one under oath—takes place in an informal environment, without the pressures 
of the courtroom. In an interview setting, a party or other witness recalling past 
events—particularly those that involve difficult or traumatic experiences— 
may feel more comfortable than in the charged atmosphere of an adversarial 
proceeding.90 
2. Administrative Law, Immigration, and the Inquisitorial Paradigm 
In administrative law, inquisitorial proceedings are legion. For example, in 
social security disability proceedings, an administrative law judge may ask 
questions about the claimant’s alleged disability and its impact on the claim-
ant’s activities.91 While a lawyer may represent the claimant and conduct an 
85. Public rights are a somewhat misleading term. These rights do not necessarily involve public law 
but instead concern rights, such as prompt receipt of officials’ collection of tax revenue, that belong to the 
government on the public’s behalf. See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 
272, 277 (1856) (upholding a summary administrative remedy to recover, on behalf of the government, 
revenues received by tax collectors); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893) 
(citing the public rights doctrine in observing that in admission “Congress might entrust the final determi-
nation of those facts to an executive officer” (emphasis added)). Cf. Fallon, supra note 18, at 1080–81 
(discussing the relationship between admission cases and the public rights doctrine). 
86. See James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party 
Requirement, and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346, 1353–57, 1362, 1375, 1384, 1386 
(2015) (explaining that federal courts historically exercised jurisdiction over matters lacking a concrete 
dispute, including naturalization, warrant requests, and remedies such as receivership for business 
organizations). 
87. See Kessler, supra note 33, at 1201. 
88. Id. at 1201–02. 
89. See id. at 1216. 
90. See id. 
91. See, e.g., Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110–11 (2000) (noting that, because Social Security pro-
ceedings are “inquisitorial rather than adversarial . . . [i]t is the ALJ’s duty to investigate the facts and de-
velop the arguments both for and against granting benefits”). Cf. Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of 
Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1290 (1975) (noting that in many modern administrative proceedings 
adversarial procedure is supplanted by the “investigatory model” and also noting that in this setting, infor-
mality is an “advantage,” allowing the “decisionmaker, in a conference-type setting . . . [to] hear the evi-
dence and discuss the dispute with the parties”). 
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examination to elicit the claimant’s testimony, the hearing officer will fre-
quently follow up with questions of her own.92 
In immigration, the inquisitorial tradition is strong. For decades, many 
decisions in immigration cases were made either by inspectors at a port of 
entry, who questioned applicants for admission to the United States to deter-
mine those applicants’ compliance with immigration law, or by examiners 
who also asked questions and decided whether a foreign national had violated 
immigration laws and hence should be deported from the United States.93 
Since the early 1990s, trained officers have interviewed applicants in the af-
firmative asylum process.94 Asylum officers are trained in country conditions 
and the persecution that refugees have suffered.95 
That perspective differs markedly from the culture in immigration court. 
In some cases, immigration judges insulted applicants or asked questions that 
were manifestly irrelevant or prejudicial.96 In addition, DHS trial lawyers, 
who represent the government in immigration court, may be gratuitously 
adversarial in cases involving meritorious claims.97 Of course, many IJs and 
DHS trial counsel do solid, professional work in a challenging environment.98 
However, in specific cases, the negative examples affect the immigration 
court’s ability to neutrally adjudicate claims, underscoring the gap created by 
restrictions on judicial review of expedited removal orders. 
92. The inquisitorial model is also integral to the functioning of the federal criminal justice system. 
The vast majority of cases are resolved through plea bargaining, in which defendants make a proffer to 
federal prosecutors, who follow up with questions in a meeting or conference room remote from the offi-
cial trappings of a court. See generally Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 
66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117 (1998). 
93. See Bill Ong Hing, No Place for Angels: In Reaction to Kevin Johnson, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 
559, 581–82 (2000) (describing the rigors of official interrogations in the early 1920’s of Chinese nation-
als seeking admission, including those like the author’s close relatives who sought admission based on 
family ties to U.S. citizens); Chapman, supra note 34, at 1538–39 (noting that, in the first half of the twen-
tieth century, “a single immigration officer would play the role of investigator, government representa-
tive, and adjudicator”). 
94. Gregg A. Beyer, Establishing the United States Asylum Officer Corps: A First Report, 4 INT’L J. 
REFUGEE L. 455, 467–72 (1992). 
95. See Amit Jain, Bureaucrats in Robes: Immigration “Judges” and the Trappings of “Courts,” 33 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 261, 317 (2019) (critiquing the fairness of adversarial procedures in immigration 
court, and acknowledging the view that asylum officers are more receptive and empathetic); Chapman, 
supra note 34, at 1536. 
96. See, e.g., De Oliveira v. Holder, 564 F.3d 892, 896–900 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding that an IJ made 
unsupported inferences about the applicant’s credibility, ignored material evidence, and asked personal 
questions unrelated to the issues, such as whether the claimant’s half-sister had been born out of wedlock 
and whether the applicant was infertile). Cf. Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration 
Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1645–47 (2010) (discussing an increasing incidence of federal court 
remands to the agency because of IJ mistakes). 
97. See Jason A. Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in Removal Proceedings, 89 TULANE 
L. REV. 1, 39–50 (2014); Mary Holper, The Unreasonable Seizures of Shadow Deportations, 86 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 923, 958–60 (2018); Jain, supra note 95, at 287–89; Won Kidane, The Inquisitorial Advantage in 
Removal Proceedings, 45 AKRON L. REV. 647, 687–97 (2011–12). 
98. See Jain, supra note 95, at 297 (quoting a senior immigration court official as expressing admira-
tion for the job done by IJs); Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 96, at 1639 
(acknowledging external factors such as budget shortfalls that challenge IJs, while suggesting that only a 
small number of IJs are actually unsuited to the task of deciding immigration cases). 
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II. HABEAS CORPUS IN IMMIGRATION AND DETENTION 
Historically, habeas in immigration cases has concerned two distinct mod-
els: nonreviewability and error-correction.99 Until the Ninth Circuit’s deci-
sion in Thuraissigiam, these approaches generally tracked the division 
between admission and entrant cases, with nonreviewability as the dominant 
approach in the former and error-correction in the latter. Under the approach 
taken in this Article, assessing the merits of each also implicates the proce-
dural due process test in Mathews v. Eldridge.100 
To resolve whether habeas is available and what standard of review applies 
in both admission cases and expanded expedited review, we should consider 
models of habeas in immigration, along with related areas—such as extra- 
dition, custody transfer, and U.S. detention of foreign nationals at 
Guantanamo. Detention at Guantanamo is important to consider because the 
Ninth Circuit in Thuraissigiam relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Boumediene v. Bush101 that detainees there had access to habeas and that 
error-correction was the appropriate standard.102 Transfer and extradition 
cases are important because each involves conveying custody of an individ-
ual from the U.S. government to a foreign power. That shift in custody entails 
some risk of the harms, including torture and death, that can follow from the 
denial of asylum in an expedited review.103 Judicial review in such cases has 
been deferential, but not entirely toothless.104 This Part frames the transfer 
and extradition cases as exemplifying a judicial inquiry into the inquisitorial 
integrity of such determinations. The next Part will suggest that the inquisito-
rial model is a better model than either nonreviewability or error-correction 
for immigration cases involving foreign nationals seeking admission to the 
United States. 
99. This Article does not explore habeas corpus’s long history. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 
723, 740–41 (2008); Stephen I. Vladeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 941, 946–49 
(2011) (reviewing HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE, by Paul D. Halliday); see also AMANDA 
L. TYLER, HABEAS CORPUS IN WARTIME: FROM THE TOWER OF LONDON TO GUANTANAMO BAY 272 
(2017) (discussing the evolving nature of habeas corpus). 
100. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). That approach tracks the view 
expressed by professors Fallon and Kovarsky. See Fallon, supra note 18, at 1078–79; Lee Kovarsky, 
Citizenship, National Security, and the Habeas Remedy, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 867, 895–900 (2019). In con-
trast, Professor Neuman has argued that habeas has force independent of other constitutional guarantees. 
See Neuman, Habeas Corpus and Executive Detention, supra note 18, at 1052–57. 
101. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
102. See Thuraissigiam v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 917 F.3d 1097, 1106 (citing Boumediene, 
553 U.S. at 766). 
103. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 702 (2008) (acknowledging that the transfer of custody to a 
regime with rule of law institutions less developed than our own could entail a risk of torture for the 
transferee). 
104. See id. at 689 (noting that transfer in the case involved “ongoing military operations conducted 
by American Forces overseas” and that “courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the 
authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs”). 
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A. Nonreviewability and Admission Cases 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted the exceptional deference owed 
to the political branches on the admission of foreign nationals.105 In keeping 
with that deference, the Court has, in some cases, entertained habeas peti-
tions challenging admission decisions, but then upheld those decisions with 
minimal or no scrutiny.106 However, even in its deferential decision in Trump 
v. Hawaii107 upholding President Trump’s executive order barring the admis-
sion of nationals of several Muslim-majority countries,108 the Court noted 
that it has engaged in a “circumscribed judicial inquiry” where an admission 
decision also allegedly affects a U.S. citizen’s constitutional rights.109 
The cases addressing the harm to U.S. citizens’ constitutional rights sug-
gest that applying a carefully “circumscribed judicial inquiry” to admission 
cases involving asylum claims would not pose an unreasonable risk of court 
intervention. The Supreme Court’s decisions in this area also employ a defer-
ential standard, upholding government action that is “facially legitimate and  
105. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418 (2018) (describing the admission and exclu-
sion of foreign nationals as a “fundamental sovereign attribute . . . largely immune from judicial control” 
(citation omitted)); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 211 (1953) (explaining that 
in admission cases, absent express legal authorization, no court should review the “determination of the 
political branch of the government” (citing Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950))). The familiar 
view that Congress has “plenary power”—virtually unchecked authority—over admission criteria owes 
much to this judicial tendency to link admission with sovereignty. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States 
(The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 603–04 (1889); see also Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 
2141 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing “political branches’ broad power over the creation and 
administration of the immigration system”); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952) (assert-
ing that with respect to criteria for both admission and removal, decisions of political branches are 
“largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference”); David A. Martin, Why Immigration’s Plenary 
Power Doctrine Endures, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 29, 44 (2015) (advancing the most compelling reasons for ju-
dicial deference). But see Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 2009–13: A New Era of 
Immigration Law Unexceptionalism?, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 57, 61–62 (2015) (arguing that deference is 
more variable than conventional account has depicted and that recent Supreme Court decisions may indi-
cate the beginnings of more probing judicial review); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the 
Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 262 (criticizing the premises of the 
doctrine); see generally Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: 
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 549–50 (1990) (assert-
ing that courts have turned to statutory interpretation to temper the harshness of the plenary power 
doctrine). 
106. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 209–10 (explaining that habeas corpus was the vehicle for Mezei’s chal-
lenge to his detention by immigration authorities after his attempt to enter the United States); id. at 210– 
13 (denying Mezei’s petition based on the longstanding tradition of deference to the political branches in 
admission cases). The Third Circuit recently invoked this tradition in finding that expedited removal of 
unauthorized immigrants close to the border did not violate the Suspension Clause. See Castro v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Homeland Security, 835 F.3d 422, 442–44 (3d Cir. 2016). 
107. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418 (2018). 
108. The executive order also included North Korea and certain nationals of Venezuela. See id. at 
2405. 
109. Id. at 2419 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 756–57 (1972)). In Mandel, the Court 
upheld a government decision to deny a visa to a foreign national journalist whom a U.S. group had 
invited to speak at an academic conference. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 756–57. The group argued that the visa 
denial affected its First Amendment right to hear a range of views on political issues. Id. Cf. Kerry v. Din, 
135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (assuming that due process safeguards applied in 
the case of a U.S. citizen whose visa application for a foreign national spouse had been denied on national 
security grounds, but then finding that the denial met due process standards). 
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bona fide.”110 The Court upheld a visa denial to a leftist speaker where the 
government had argued that the applicant’s conduct while in the United 
States under a previous visa had exceeded the visa’s terms.111 The Supreme 
Court found that this rationale met the “facially legitimate and bona fide” 
standard.112 Applying a similarly deferential standard to asylum admission 
cases would leave most government decisions intact, but would at least pro-
duce a modest check on officials. 
At least one early Supreme Court decision, Gegiow v. Uhl,113 suggests that 
some measure of review was considered possible in admission cases. In 
Gegiow, Justice Holmes found that an immigration inspector was “exceeding 
his power” by denying admission to a Russian national on the grounds that 
the petitioner was likely to become a “public charge”—a statutory term for 
an individual whom the government would be obliged to support because the 
person in question was wholly incapable of supporting herself.114 According 
to Holmes, the inspector had forsaken the inquiry into “permanent personal” 
factors, such as individual assets or severe disabilities that should inform the 
public charge determination, and had instead engaged in a free-floating in-
quiry regarding whether the local labor market was already saturated.115 
Holmes suggested an alternative to nonreviewability that would largely defer 
to official decisions based on the statute but would intervene if the inspector 
had introduced factors such as local labor conditions that Congress had not 
included within the inspector’s ambit of authority.116 
There is also substantial reason to question the post-Gegiow cases cement-
ing blanket nonreviewability of admission decisions. For example, in 
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,117 the Supreme Court upheld the 
denial of admission to a returning LPR against a due process challenge, even 
though efforts to find another country to take the petitioner had been 
110. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419 (2018); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 
756–57 (1972). 
111. See Mandel, 408 U.S. at 759 (reporting the government’s position that the applicant’s conduct 
during a previous visit included fundraising, which went “far beyond the stated purposes of his trip” that 
U.S. officials had relied on in the earlier visa grant); see also id. at 759 n.5 (discussing the circumstances 
of the event at which the applicant spoke during his earlier visit, which included fundraising for student 
demonstrators in Europe; that fundraising took place after the applicant’s talk). 
112. Id. at 756–57. 
113. Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3 (1915). 
114. See id. at 9. 
115. See id. at 10. 
116. See Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, supra note 18, at 1015 (discussing 
Gegiowv. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3 (1915)). The Trump Administration has just issued a new rule that substantially 
expands the criteria for determining that a foreign national is a public charge under the INA. See 
Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41292 (Aug. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. 
pts. 103, 212-14, 245, 248). Compare City & Cty. of San Francisco v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration 
Servs., 944 F.3d 773, 790–98 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that the public charge rule should receive Chevron 
deference), with New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 408 F. Supp. 3d 334, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 
2019) (granting a preliminary injunction against the DHS’ rule redefining “public charge,” on the grounds 
that the rule is inconsistent with longtime administrative practice and logic of the INA). See also Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599 (2020) (issuing a stay of the district court’s preliminary 
injunction). Analysis of the new rule is beyond the scope of this Article. 
117. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
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unsuccessful, and his indefinite detention in the United States was a likely 
outcome of the decision. In contrast, this Article’s analysis suggests that the 
foreign national’s interest in avoiding indefinite detention should elicit judi-
cial review in admission cases where other countries have refused to accept 
the petitioner. 
The facts surrounding Mezei and a case on which Mezei relied, United 
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,118 should also counsel revisiting their 
precedential force. In Mezei, the government declined to show the Supreme 
Court its evidence that the petitioner was a security risk, eliciting the ire of 
dissenters Justice Jackson and Justice Black.119 Evidence in subsequent 
administrative proceedings undertaken at the initiative of the Attorney 
General revealed that during his long legal residence in the United States, 
prior to the trip abroad that triggered the denial of admission, Mezei had 
belonged to a leftist political group with some links to the Communist Party. 
But testimony linking Mezei to the Communist Party came from an individ-
ual whom the government had used repeatedly as a witness in loyalty cases 
and paid a substantial sum for this work. Furthermore, the government never 
disclosed the witness’s prior extensive work on its behalf to the petitioner 
and, after the case concluded, the government investigated the witness on 
perjury charges.120 
The tribunal in these proceedings ordered Mezei removed. However, it 
informally recommended that the government offer Mezei parole and release 
on conditions in the United States, where Mezei remained without incident 
for the rest of his life.121 These palliative measures would have been unthink-
able had Mezei posed a genuine threat.122 Given this troubled history and the 
ease of adopting a reasonable alternative that would provide a measure of ju-
dicial review, the case for revisiting nonreviewability is strong, at least in 
cases where the stakes for the applicant for admission involve indefinite 
detention or the risk of persecution abroad. 
118. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). 
119. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 219–22, 226 (Jackson, J., dissent-
ing) (explaining that the petitioner had gone to Hungary to his visit elderly mother, and had then been 
unable to make a timely return to the United States due to the “disturbed conditions of Eastern Europe;” 
reporting on petitioner’s “nearly two years” in detention upon his attempted return to the United States 
and refusal of other countries to accept him after the United States branded him a security risk; and high-
lighting the risk that detention “without disclosure . . . of charges, evidence, informers or reasons” will 
“drift into oppression of the disadvantaged in this country as surely as it has elsewhere”); id. at 216–17 
(Black, J., dissenting) (noting that the petitioner had been a longtime LPR whose case the Court treated as 
one of admission, as the petitioner had traveled to Hungary and remained there for well over a year; and 
asserting that the petitioner had then been denied admission because of evidence from “secret informers” 
that government declined to disclose even to the Supreme Court). 
120. Weisselberg, supra note 46, at 979–81 (noting that the witness had repeatedly given false testi-
mony in other cases, and even conceded under oath that he would lie if the government requested that he 
do so). 
121. Id. at 983–84. 
122. Faulty information also played a central role in the case of war bride Ellen Knauff, whose exclu-
sion was upheld by the Supreme Court, but in subsequent agency proceedings was revealed as the product 
of rumors and lies. See id. at 961–64 (discussing the aforementioned proceedings and noting that the tri-
bunal ultimately ordered Knauff’s admission as a LPR). 
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B. Error-Correction in Immigration Law 
If nonreviewability has been a dominant strand in admission cases, cases 
involving entrants have often applied an error-correction approach. That 
approach to entrant cases includes review of errors of law, but only a very 
narrow review of mixed questions of law and fact or strictly factual determi-
nations.123 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Thuraissigiam sought to import 
the error-correction mode into judicial review of expedited removal, 
despite Congressionally-imposed limitations on review in that setting.124 
Thuraissigiam’s rationale relied heavily on two Supreme Court decisions: 
(1) INS v. St. Cyr,125 in which the Court construed the INA as permitting 
access to habeas for already-entered LPRs who were removable due to U.S. 
criminal convictions; and, (2) Boumediene v. Bush,126 in which the Court 
held that Guantanamo detainees had access to habeas.127 However, the Ninth 
Circuit’s reliance on St. Cyr and Boumediene ignored crucial differences 
between admission cases and those involving either entrants or Guantanamo 
detainees. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit in Thuraissigiam glossed over anoma-
lies on the link between habeas and due process in Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
for the Court in Boumediene—anomalies that are dissected in Chief Justice 
Roberts’ dissent in that case.128 
Courts have regularly applied the writ’s error-correction mode to review of 
immigration matters involving LPRs or those who have entered the United 
States. In INS v. St. Cyr,129 the Supreme Court read a recent INA provision 
purporting to limit access to the courts to permit a habeas petition by an 
LPR.130 The LPR’s habeas petition argued on statutory grounds against retro-
active application of another recent provision that eliminated relief from  
123. See Acharya v. Holder, 761 F.3d 289, 299 (2d Cir. 2014) (remanding the decision to deny the 
petitioner’s application for asylum, as the IJ applied an “overly stringent” legal standard for the nexus 
between the petitioner’s persecution and his political opinion); see also id. at 295–96 (describing the 
review of an agency’s factual findings as “exceedingly narrow”). 
124. See Thuraissigiam v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 1118 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that 
expedited removal contains no provision for “rigorous adversarial proceedings” and strongly suggesting 
that this was the fatal flaw with process in Thuraissigiam’s case, while remanding it to the district court to 
make the initial decision on precisely what process was required to bring expedited removal into compli-
ance with the Suspension Clause). 
125. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
126. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
127. Id. at 766. The scholarly literature on Boumediene is vast. See, e.g., Joshua A. Geltzer, Of 
Suspension, Due Process, and Guantanamo: The Reach of the Fifth Amendment After Boumediene and 
the Relationship Between Habeas Corpus and Due Process, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 719, 738–41, 747-65 
(2012) (discussing possible models of interaction of habeas and due process); Jared A. Goldstein, Habeas 
Without Rights, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 1165 (arguing that due process and habeas are distinct checks on the 
political branches); Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene’s Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the 
Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2111–12, 2112 nn. 30–32 (2009) (suggesting that 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court was shaped by concern about both harm to the separation of 
powers wrought by congressional curbing of judicial review and the risk of arbitrary and unreasonably 
protracted detention in the absence of a robust judicial check). 
128. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 813–14. 
129. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 305. 
130. Id. 
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removal for certain criminal convictions.131 While the Court held on statutory 
grounds that Congress had not been sufficiently precise in curbing the Great 
Writ, Justice Stevens’ majority opinion strongly suggested that Congress 
lacked power under the Constitution to categorically preclude judicial review 
of legal questions in cases involving LPRs.132 However, Justice Stevens lim-
ited his opinion to cases involving LPRs and entrants, notably avoiding any 
indication that access to judicial review in admission cases was similarly 
robust.133 
In Thuraissigiam, the Ninth Circuit read St. Cyr too broadly, ignoring the 
distinction between admission and entrant cases that was part of the essential 
backdrop for the Supreme Court’s decision. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit at one 
point characterized an entrant case in a fashion that obscured this distinction, 
elaborating on the unlawful manner of the petitioner’s entry instead of noting 
that at the time of the decision he had resided in the United States for over 
twenty years.134 Although there may be room for debate about the precise 
temporal threshold after entry into the United States that triggers robust judi-
cial review of administrative removal decisions, a full generation of resi-
dence meets any reasonable test.135 Despite the Ninth Circuit’s assertion, that 
element of longtime U.S. domicile makes such cases far less germane to the 
admission context. 
Boumediene v. Bush also fails to support the Ninth Circuit’s analysis. 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court did not address cases in which offi-
cials denied admission to a foreign national. Instead, Boumediene dealt with 
an issue far closer to habeas’s heartland—the U.S. government’s power to 
confine individuals indefinitely.136 Justice Kennedy wrote that a Guantanamo 
detainee confined in the United States’ armed conflict with Al Qaeda could 
resort to habeas for “a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being 
131. See id. at 315–22 (conceding that Congress could have made this elimination from relief retro-
active, but—in the absence of clear evidence that Congress intended such a result—applying the pre-
sumption against retroactive application to preserve relief for convictions that had become final before 
the effective date of the provision). 
132. See id. at 305 (asserting that a “serious Suspension Clause issue” would have arisen if the Court 
had read the jurisdiction limiting provision as having abrogated the federal courts’ power to address “pure 
questions of law,” be they statutory or constitutional). 
133. See id. at 304 (citing Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 234–35 (1953) (construing the statute to 
preserve habeas for entrants based on statutory language that made agency action regarding deportation 
final “except insofar as it was required by the Constitution”)). 
134. See Thuraissigiam v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 917 F.3d 1097, 1115 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing 
United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 262 (1954)). The Ninth Circuit reported that 
Accardi had entered the United States “from Canada ‘without immigration inspection and without an im-
migration visa.’” Id. (citing Accardi, 347 U.S. at 262). However, the Ninth Circuit failed to mention the 
facts that the Supreme Court in Accardi had deemed to be “relevant,” including the petitioner’s residence 
in the United States—albeit without legal status—since 1932, more than twenty years before the Supreme 
Court rendered its decision. See Accardi, 347 U.S. at 262. 
135. A twenty-year period of residence—at least when also assuming unbroken physical presence in 
the country—would exceed by a factor of ten the outer boundary of two years that Congress has set for 
expedited removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) (2012). That outer temporal boundary is the 
threshold that expanded expedited removal will enforce. See DHS Expansion Notice, supra note 5. 
136. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766. 
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held pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or interpretation’ of relevant 
law.”137 In crafting an approach to judicial review of long-term confinement 
at Guantanamo, Justice Kennedy invoked Johnson v. Eisentrager,138 in which 
the Supreme Court had denied a habeas corpus petition brought by a German 
prisoner who had been convicted by a U.S. military tribunal abroad of capital 
war crimes arising out of World War II.139 
An approach forged in the crucible of wartime detention, prosecution, and 
punishment is not an obvious fit for an immigration admission case. In ha-
beas, the central remedy is typically release from confinement.140 After 
Boumediene, a court considering a habeas petition by a Guantanamo detainee 
determines whether the detainee was part of Al Qaeda or the Taliban at the 
time of his capture; if the court answered that question in the negative, it 
may order that individual’s release.141 In contrast, in admission cases, the 
United States detains an individual only incidentally, to ensure her re-
moval.142 Because the candidate for admission has by definition not resided  
137. Id. at 779 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001)). 
138. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
139. See generally id.; see also Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766 (noting that the Boumediene test was 
based in part on “language from Eisentrager”). Justice Kennedy was concerned that without access to ha-
beas, detention at Guantanamo could be inordinately protracted. See id. at 772 (noting that the petitioners 
“have been denied meaningful access to a judicial forum for a period of years” and expressing concern 
about “harms petitioners may endure from additional delay”); see also Al-Alwi v. Trump, 139 S. Ct. 
1893, 1894 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring) (observing that the petitioner “faces the real prospect that he 
will spend the rest of his life in detention based on his status as an enemy combatant a generation ago, 
even though today’s conflict may differ substantially from the one Congress anticipated” when it author-
ized the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, shortly after the September 11th attacks). In his opinion 
for the Court in Boumediene, Justice Kennedy distilled the following factors from his reading of 
Eisentrager: (1) the “citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which 
the status determination was made”—the term “status” referring to whether the petitioner was part of Al 
Qaeda or the Taliban and hence subject to detention under the law of armed conflict; (2) the “nature of the 
sites where apprehension and then detention took place”; and, (3) the “practical obstacles inherent in 
resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766. The first and second fac-
tors spoke specifically to Guantanamo detention and have little relevance to immigration admission cases. 
See id. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit in Thuraissigiam conceded this. See Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1108 
(agreeing with both parties to the case that the factors outlined by Justice Kennedy in Boumediene “do not 
map precisely onto this case”). 
140. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (noting that the “traditional function of the writ 
is to secure release from illegal custody” (citation omitted)). In admission cases, foreign nationals do not 
seek release per se; they want release along with permission to enter the United States and remain in this 
country. That goal separates admission cases from the “traditional function of the writ” that Chief Justice 
Roberts discussed in Munaf. 
141. See Hussain v. Obama, 718 F.3d 964, 968–71 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (articulating a circumstantial test 
for status as part of Al Qaeda or the Taliban, based on a convergence of several factors—including train-
ing with Al Qaeda—which together make it unlikely that a neutral explanation would account for the 
detainee’s pattern of activity); id. at 968 (referring to this test colloquially as the “duck-test”). But see id. 
at 971–73 (Edwards, J., concurring) (suggesting that the court’s test, while dictated by D.C. Circuit prece-
dent, was insufficiently rigorous to justify long-term detention). See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, The 
Passive-Aggressive Virtues, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 122, 137–39 (2011) (suggesting that courts 
have often been too cautious or wary of confrontation with the political branches after 9/11, and that such 
caution has either impeded or distorted the development of legal doctrine). 
142. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 836 (2018); see also Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 
954, 959 (2019) (describing the INA’s framework for “detention pending a decision on removal”). 
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in the United States or formed ties here, in most cases she is no worse off 
than when she applied for admission in the first place.143 Compared with the 
rigors of indefinite wartime detention, the death penalty, or incarceration as 
punishment for a crime, denial of admission is not as compelling a depriva-
tion for remedy through the Great Writ. 
Further, the Ninth Circuit in Thuraissigiam relied excessively on Justice 
Kennedy’s reservation in Boumediene of the question of Guantanamo detain-
ees’ due process rights.144 While there are certainly contexts in which a peti-
tioner uses habeas to vindicate other rights,145 Justice Kennedy’s decision in 
Boumediene borrowed liberally from the case law and concepts of due pro-
cess.146 A central prong in procedural due process analysis—the risk of error 
in the challenged procedural framework—was essential to Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion finding the need for habeas as a corrective.147 Any context in which 
habeas is available assumes that the process that has harmed the petitioner  
143. Courts have long distinguished entrants to the United States on this basis. See, e.g., Yamataya v. 
Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 101–02 (1903) (holding that due process applies to a 
foreign national who “has entered the country, and has become . . . a part of its population” (emphasis 
added)). In the next section, I argue that asylum seekers have a larger stake in proceedings because they 
allege that denial of admission will typically entail removal to their home country where they will face 
persecution, including the risk of arrest, torture, or death. See infra notes 199–205 and accompanying 
text. 
144. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 785 (2008) (observing that the Court would “make no 
judgment whether . . . [administrative remedies for Guantanamo detainees] satisfy due process stand-
ards”); see also Thuraissigiam v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 917 F.3d 1097, 1112 (9th Cir. 2019) (not-
ing the Boumediene majority’s decision to leave for another day the question of whether the Due Process 
Clause protected Guantanamo detainees); id. at 1111 (asserting that “the rights protected by the 
Suspension Clause are not identical to those under the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process”). 
145. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (granting the post-conviction habeas petition 
made by an immigrant who had pleaded guilty to an offense that made him removable, on the ground that 
his defense lawyer had provided ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment’s fair trial 
guarantee by failing to provide him with information about the immigration consequences of his convic-
tion). In the ordinary criminal justice system, defendants who have exhausted their direct appeals some-
times collaterally attack their convictions through habeas corpus, citing the Sixth Amendment or other 
provisions of the Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court has held that if Congress or a state legislature restricts 
access to habeas as a collateral remedy for criminal defendants, the statute limiting habeas must also fur-
nish an acceptable substitute. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977). In Boumediene, Justice 
Kennedy noted this as a building block in his argument that Congress could violate the Suspension Clause 
by limiting habeas for criminal defendants collaterally attacking their convictions and failing to provide 
an adequate substitute, even if the underlying criminal trial was consistent with due process. Boumediene, 
553 U.S. at 785 (arguing that even though a “full criminal trial” presumably comports with due process, 
legislative limits on habeas must still include an adequate substitute, suggesting as a result that habeas 
and due process are not co-extensive). However, as Chief Justice Roberts observed in his dissent in 
Boumediene, habeas is vital as a collateral remedy for wrongful criminal convictions precisely because 
habeas helps bring to the surface underlying flaws in the initial trial, including ineffective assistance of 
counsel or the presentation of evidence that a defendant has showed on collateral view was inaccurate and 
should give way to evidence of the defendant’s actual innocence. See id. at 813–14 (Roberts, C.J., dissent-
ing) (discussing the range of purposes of habeas, with each having a different scope of habeas review). 
146. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 781 (noting that the scope of review for habeas hinges on whether 
“the rigor of any earlier proceedings accords with our test for procedural adequacy in the due process con-
text” (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976))); see also Gerald Neuman, The Habeas 
Corpus Suspension Clause After Boumediene v. Bush, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 553–56 (2010) (discus-
sing Boumediene’s nod to due process balancing). 
147. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783–84 (noting what Justice Kennedy viewed as substantial flaws 
in the administrative process for the release of Guantanamo detainees). 
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has some underlying error or lack of fairness that habeas will remedy.148 The 
issue of habeas corpus’s availability for Guantanamo detainees fits this tem-
plate; if habeas or an adequate substitute must be available, it is because the 
absence of habeas will countenance a state of affairs—such as protracted, ar-
bitrary, and wrongful detention—that violates the petitioner’s rights.149 An 
account like Justice Kennedy’s in Boumediene veers into incoherence if it 
purports to find a violation of the Suspension Clause without identifying 
“what rights either habeas [or an administrative substitute]. . . is supposed to 
protect.”150 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Thuraissigiam flirts with incoher-
ence in much the same way.151 
C. Inquisitorial Integrity 
The error-correction and nonreviewability approaches do not exhaust the 
options available for habeas review. This Subsection discusses an alternative 
approach that the Supreme Court has used most often in cases of extradition 
or other transfers of individuals from U.S. custody to other nations.152 While 
the case law on what I refer to as inquisitorial integrity in the extradition/ 
transfer process typically deals with actual or claimed U.S. citizens, 
148. See id. at 813–14 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 813 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 
1, 75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining that “the question of which specific safeguards of the 
Constitution are to be applied in a particular context . . . can be reduced to the issue of what process is 
‘due’ a defendant in the particular circumstances of a particular case”)). Cf. Kovarsky, supra note 100, at 
895–900 (arguing—based on historical practice—that habeas is a vehicle for remedying violations of 
other substantive constitutional rights). 
149. At least one modern scholar has argued that habeas should not be available for enemy fighters, 
even those who have entered the United States. See generally Andrew Kent, Judicial Review for Enemy 
Fighters: The Court’s Fateful Turn in Ex Parte Quirin, 66 VAND. L. REV. 153 (2013). In contrast, this 
Article’s approach assumes that habeas would be available in that situation. However, a full discussion of 
that point is beyond this Article’s scope. 
150. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 813 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
151. In addition to its substantive anomalies, the Ninth Circuit’s broad reading of Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion in Boumediene also clashes with the most plausible prediction of the current Supreme Court’s 
reading. Justice Kennedy has retired, and on most issues relevant to habeas corpus Kennedy’s replace-
ment, Justice Gorsuch, is more conservative. Little in Justice Gorsuch’s track record suggests that he 
views habeas as an expansive remedy unmoored from distinct constitutional rights. See Wilson v. Sellers, 
138 S. Ct. 1188, 1198 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting an earlier Supreme Court decision assert-
ing that habeas is “a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems” (citation 
omitted)). In most cases in which the Court is closely divided, as it was in Boumediene, Chief Justice 
Roberts is now the swing vote. See, e.g., Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573–76 
(2019) (finding that the Department of Commerce’s rationale for adding a citizenship question to the cen-
sus was pretextual). Given Chief Justice Roberts’ skepticism about Justice Kennedy’s approach in 
Boumediene, the Court’s current configuration does not augur well for an expansive reading of that 
decision. 
152. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 694–95 (2008); Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 529–30 
(1957); Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502, 509 (1896) (denying a habeas petition brought by an individual 
subject to extradition and noting that the “judgment of the magistrate rendered in good faith on legal evi-
dence . . . is final . . . unless palpably erroneous in law”); In re Stupp, 23 F. Cas. 296, 303 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1875). Professor Gerald Neuman discussed the relevance of extradition as a possible “analogue” to cases 
involving denial of admission in his important article on immigration and habeas. See Neuman, Habeas 
Corpus and Executive Detention, supra note 18, at 990–1005. One Supreme Court immigration admission 
decision is also consistent with the model of inquisitorial integrity outlined here. See Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 
U.S. 3, 9 (1915) (holding that an immigration inspector who applied the wrong test to determine whether 
a candidate for admission was likely to become a “public charge” was thus “exceeding his power”). 
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petitioners in such cases face a risk of harm from prosecution and punishment 
in the state seeking custody. Versions of asylum dating back to the Founding 
Era have been salient in the evolution of precedent in this domain.153 As the 
next Part suggests, the interest of the petitioner in avoiding a bad-faith prose-
cution in such cases parallels the interest of the asylum claimant in avoiding 
persecution based on one of the INA’s protected grounds.154 
This body of law reviews inquisitorial proceedings, in which an official 
investigates, asks questions, and then makes a determination on a party’s 
request. Generally, the cases require some measure of independence by the 
examining officer, who must also act in good faith,155 avoid plain legal 
error,156 and provide basic procedural protections such as an opportunity to 
be heard.157 Meeting these relatively relaxed requirements ensures that the 
outcome of the proceedings has integrity. That relaxed approach imposes 
some check on executive decisions, although it consciously avoids the more 
rigorous strictures of the error-correction model, which would impinge on 
the efficiency needed in contexts such as extradition and transfers of custody. 
1. Independence 
A measure of independence is crucial to the integrity of the inquisitorial 
process. In the extradition or transfer process, the inquisitor cannot be com-
pletely beholden to the requesting state. That would make the requesting state 
the “judge of its own case.” Insulating the inquisitor from that influence is 
necessary for integrity. 
A prominent Founding Era controversy—the Jonathan Robbins affair— 
catalyzed this concern for independence.158 The Robbins case arose because 
in 1799, Britain requested the extradition of one Thomas Nash on charges of 
mutiny.159 In response, Nash claimed that he was actually a U.S. citizen, 
Jonathan Robbins, whom the British had impressed into their navy. The mat-
ter quickly became a political controversy in the United States, since Britain  
153. See United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 832 (D.S.C. 1799). 
154. See infra Section III, and accompanying footnotes nn. 196–202. 
155. See United States. v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 422 (1886) (noting that the doctrine of “spe-
cialty,” which bars material variation between charges that formed the basis of an extradition request and 
those actually brought upon a suspect’s return, guards against “fraud” and “bad faith” by the requesting 
country). 
156. See In re Stupp, 23 F. Cas. 296, 303 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875). 
157. See infra notes 187–95 and accompanying text. 
158. United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 832 (D.S.C. 1799). The case name appears in the offi-
cial reporter without the second “b” in Robbins’ name. Significant scholarly literature has developed 
around this episode. See generally Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 
100 YALE L.J. 229 (1990); see also Peter Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law: Presidential 
Stewardship, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Separation of Powers, 94 B.U. L. REV. 105, 134–38 
(2014); Neuman, Habeas Corpus and Executive Detention, supra note 18, at 995–96; John T. Parry, 
International Extradition, the Rule of Non-Inquiry, and the Problem of Sovereignty, 90 B.U. L. REV. 
1973, 1975 n.10 (2010) (terming this incident a “cautionary tale of executive power for decades to 
come”). 
159. Wedgwood, supra note 158, at 286. 
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made the request under the Jay Treaty, which had been negotiated by the 
Federalist John Jay but had drawn the indignation of Jeffersonian 
Republicans as elevating British interests at American expense.160 The 
Jeffersonian Republicans also expressed sympathy for mutineers, whom they 
took to be engaging in political action, using self-help as the only recourse 
against the notoriously harsh discipline practiced by British naval 
commanders on their crews, which often included impressed U.S. seamen.161 
With no legislation implementing the Jay Treaty’s extradition provision, 
Federalist President Adams had to act without congressional guidance. 
Adams informed the federal judge presiding over Britain’s extradition 
request of Adams’ “advice and request” that the judge order Nash’s return.162 
The judge conducted an inquiry that resulted in Nash’s return to the British 
and eventual trial, conviction, and execution. The Jeffersonian Republicans’ 
anger at what they perceived as Adams acting without congressional authori-
zation and impinging on judicial independence resulted in a close vote 
against Adams’ impeachment, Republican electoral ascendancy in the elec-
tion of 1800, and the absence of any U.S. extradition for almost fifty years.163 
Extradition only resumed in the middle of the 19th century, after then- 
Secretary of State Daniel Webster concluded the Webster-Ashburton Treaty 
with Britain.164 Viewed as a reflection of Founding Era constitutionalism, the 
Robbins episode highlighted the need for independence in extradition as cen-
tral to maintaining consensus on the primacy of the rule of law. 
Courts conducting habeas proceedings under the Webster-Ashburton 
Treaty noted the independence that the agreement built into the extradition 
process and the relevance of that process to alleviating concerns about politi-
cal persecution by the requesting country. Although neither the treaty nor a 
statute expressly authorized habeas jurisdiction for the appeal of grants of a 
country’s request for extradition, federal courts immediately began consider-
ation of habeas requests by the subjects of extradition requests.165 The habeas 
court reviewed a decision that already included safeguards for independence: 
the commissioner who examined the requesting country’s charges was an 
160. Id. at 289–92. 
161. Margulies, supra note 158, at 134–35; Wedgwood, supra note 158, at 284–85. 
162. Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law, supra note 158, at 136–37; Wedgwood, supra 
note 158, at 292. This request was conveyed through Adams’ Secretary of State, Timothy Pickering. See 
Margulies, supra note 158, at 137. 
163. Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law, supra note 158, at 138. The Robbins affair was 
the occasion for John Marshall’s famous speech to Congress, in which Marshall argued that the President 
is the “sole organ” for U.S. positions on foreign affairs, but also appeared to suggest that Congress had a 
role in the execution of treaty obligations. See 10 Annals of Cong. 613 (1800). 
164. See Treaty to Settle and Define the Boundaries Between the Territories of the United States and 
the Possessions of Her Britannic Majesty in North America, for the Final Suppression of the African 
Slave-Trade, and For the Giving Up of Criminals Fugitive from Justice, in Certain Cases (Webster- 
Ashburton Treaty), Aug. 9, 1842, entered into force Oct. 13, 1842, 8 Stat. 572, 12 Bevans 82. 
165. See In re Kaine, 14 F. Cas. 84, 87 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1852) (asserting that the court had the author-
ity to consider the subject’s challenge to his extradition and that the Suspension Clause precluded the use 
of the treaty power to curb access to habeas, at least in a “time of peace”), writ dismissed on other 
grounds, 55 U.S. 103 (1852). 
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independent officer appointed by the Federal Circuit Court in New York.166 
That independence quelled the concern, manifested first in the Robbins mat-
ter and then by popular sentiment in Kaine, that the requesting country— 
Britain—and the United States were colluding in extradition to assist the 
requesting country’s political designs.167 Subsequent cases have also stressed 
independence.168 
2. The Overarching Premise of Good Faith 
Good faith is part of the backdrop for extradition, which occurs under 
bilateral treaties entered into by the United States and other states. In extradi-
tion, the doctrine of specialty is a crucial safeguard that reduces the chance 
for “bad faith” and subterfuge by the state requesting extradition.169 
Extradition agreements ensure that individuals who commit crimes that affect 
the “life, liberty, and person” of others cannot evade legal accountability 
through flight to another country.170 Extradition treaties typically enumerate 
serious offenses—such as murder, robbery, or forgery—which would trigger 
return to a requesting state.171 However, the benefits of extradition for enforc-
ing accountability came with a crucial caveat that ensured that extradition 
would not become a tool for political oppression. 
In United States v. Rauscher, the Supreme Court noted “the policy of all 
governments” to “grant. . . asylum to persons who have fled from their homes 
166. See id. at 88, 92. 
167. See id. at 87 (expressing concern, based on prior developments in the case, that the subject of 
the request—a national of Ireland—might be “rescued from the custody of the law by a mob” intent on 
preventing his extradition to Britain); see also Neuman, Habeas Corpus and Executive Detention, supra 
note 18, at 998 (discussing the case). 
168. For example, Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957) involved the U.S.’ agreement to waive its 
right under a bilateral agreement to try a service member accused of misconduct. Pursuant to the waiver, 
the U.S. permitted Japan to try the service member. In Girard, the post-World War II relationship 
between the U.S. and Japan furnished sufficient assurance that the decision to defer to Japan was not the 
product of Japan’s undue influence. Japan had unconditionally surrendered at the war’s conclusion, and 
war crimes trials addressing Japanese atrocities during the conflict had occurred shortly thereafter. See 
Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 199 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring); Stephen I. Vladeck, 
Deconstructing Hirota: Habeas Corpus, Citizenship, and Article III, 95 GEO. L.J. 1497, 1499–1500 
(2007). Japan was in no position to intimidate the United States into surrendering a U.S. service member. 
Under the circumstances, the nature of the U.S.-Japan relationship guaranteed that the United States’ 
waiver of its rights under the agreement constituted an independent decision. 
Similarly, in Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008), the Court upheld the transfer of two U.S. citizens 
—who had allegedly joined the insurgency that followed the toppling of Saddam Hussein—to Iraqi 
authorities by a U.N.-authorized multinational force run by the United States. Id. at 681–84. The context 
of Munaf framed the issue of independence differently: it concerned whether a post-Saddam Hussein re-
gime manifestly beholden to the United States could keep a neutral posture about an individual whom the 
United States clearly believed to be an insurgent who threatened U.S. interests as well as Iraqi security. 
While the question is closer than in Girard, the Munaf Court could cite evidence of Iraqi tribunals’ inde-
pendence. In one of the two cases that the Court had heard together in Munaf, an Iraqi tribunal had dis-
played independence by vacating the petitioner’s conviction and requiring more investigation. See id. at 
684. While this fact did not figure heavily in Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion for the Court, it provided at 
least a baseline indication that the Iraqi tribunal would not be a mere rubber stamp for the U.S. executive 
branch’s expedient calculus. 
169. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 422 (1886). 
170. See id. at 420. 
171. See id. at 421. 
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on account of political disturbances.”172 Extradition treaties exclude “politi-
cal offenses,” since allowing returns in such cases could cement a requesting 
state’s power over its domestic opponents and undermine the purpose of asy-
lum.173 Under the doctrine of specialty, a requesting state must allege that an 
individual committed a “specific offense” covered by the extradition 
treaty.174 Once the requesting state cites that specific charge as the basis for 
an extradition request, it cannot substitute another offense after it obtains 
custody of the individual.175 
This requirement of consistency between the basis for the extradition 
request and the subsequent prosecution in the requesting state guards against 
“fraud” and “bad faith” in the extradition process. It thus ensures the integrity 
of the process and mandates adherence to the “solemn” purposes of extradi-
tion agreements.176 The duty to comply with the doctrine of specialty binds 
both the requesting state and the state honoring the extradition request; a state 
must reject a request if that nation reasonably believes that the requesting 
state intends to breach the specialty principle.177 Good faith has also played a 
role in more recent cases addressing this issue.178 
172. Id. at 420. 
173. See id. At the time of Rauscher, asylum was often the tacit result of an individual emigrating to 
another country, since many countries, including the United States, lacked immigration laws to keep out 
foreign nationals. See generally Matthew J. Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion: Sovereignty, Security, and 
the Origins of the Federal Immigration Power, 45 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 1 (2010); Gerald L. 
Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993); 
James E. Pfander & Theresa R. Wardon, Reclaiming the Immigration Constitution of the Early Republic: 
Prospectivity, Uniformity, and Transparency, 96 VA. L. REV. 359 (2010). 
174. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 419. 
175. Id. at 419–20. 
176. Id. at 422. 
177. Id. 
178. In Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008), a unanimous Court upheld the transfer to Iraqi author-
ities by a U.N.-authorized multinational force run by the United States of two U.S. citizens who had trav-
eled voluntarily to Iraq and then allegedly committed crimes in the ongoing insurgency against the 
post-Saddam Hussein regime. See id. at 681–84. The Court stated that it would not review the transfer on 
the merits, referring to the longstanding principle of territorial jurisdiction, which allows a state to prose-
cute alleged criminal conduct on its own territory. Id. at 694–95; see also Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 
529 (1957). However, in Girard, which Munaf cited, the Court assured itself that the transfer of a U.S. 
service member to Japan was done in good faith. See id. at 532–36 (including an appendix consisting of 
an affidavit by Department of Defense General Counsel Robert Dechert, who described in detail the serv-
ice member’s apparent culpability in the homicide; according to Dechert’s affidavit the service member 
had willfully fired a shell casing from a grenade launcher at close range in the direction of a Japanese 
female civilian scavenging for copper casings after luring in the victim by throwing casings on the 
ground). Moreover, all of the Justices in Munaf agreed that the transfer in that case met the threshold crite-
rion of good faith. Both opinions in the case observed that the petitioners had not submitted evidence that 
the United States had transferred the petitioners to facilitate their interrogation by Iraqi authorities under 
conditions that would be illegal in the United States. See Munaf, 553 U.S. at 702 (noting that the peti-
tioners had “allege[d] only the possibility of mistreatment” by Iraqis, and that U.S.-Iraqi diplomatic 
exchanges on the issue of prisoner abuse helped persuade the Court that this was not a case “in which the 
Executive has determined that a detainee is likely to be tortured but decides to transfer him anyway”); id. 
at 706–07 (Souter, J., concurring) (suggesting that habeas or another remedy would be available if the 
U.S. government planned to transfer a detainee to a country where the risk of torture was clear, but imply-
ing that this was not such a case). In addition, the rationale for deference regarding transfers to a state 
exercising territorial jurisdiction may not be as compelling for transfers to other states that lack this vener-
able foundation for adjudication. See generally Doe v. Mattis, 889 F.3d 745 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (upholding 
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3. Plain Error and the Officer’s Power 
In a leading case, the court also asked whether the determination to extra-
dite “exceeded the jurisdiction” of the official presiding over the inquisitorial 
process.179 During the nineteenth-century, when extradition doctrine devel-
oped, courts often cited this element, which also in practice covered plain 
legal error.180 The modest review contemplated by this requirement ensures 
that extradition and transfer stay within the parameters of the legal system 
rather than becoming creatures of executive whim or caprice. 
In Gegiow v. Uhl,181 Justice Holmes wrote for the Court in the single 
admission case that relied on this standard, granting the writ because the 
“commissioner of immigration. . . [was] exceeding his power.”182 The inspec-
tor misconstrued the statutory requirement that the candidate for admission 
not be “likely to become a public charge”; he defined “public charge” as 
including consideration of specific local labor market conditions instead of 
the “permanent personal” attributes of the noncitizen, such as a history of de-
pendence on others or risk of future dependence due to severe physical or 
mental disabilities.183 
In reinforcing that the inspector’s misreading of the legal standard had 
resulted in a decision beyond the inspector’s scope of power, Justice Holmes 
an injunction against the transfer of a U.S. citizen to a state without a territorial link, absent a further 
showing by the government). 
Establishing threshold good faith has also played a role in immigration decisions featuring a “circum-
scribed judicial inquiry” into admission decisions that may affect the rights of U.S. citizens. See, e.g., 
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419 (2018) (upholding President Trump’s travel ban on the admission 
of persons from several countries, most of which were Muslim-majority, and indicating that even when 
an admissions decision implicates the First Amendment interests of U.S. nationals in free speech or no 
established church, courts should defer to executive decisions about admission that are “facially legiti-
mate and bona fide”); Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (applying a 
standard based on the assumption that due process applied in the case of a U.S. citizen seeking review of 
an Afghan spouse’s visa denial); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 756–57 (1972). Each of these deci-
sions is quite deferential; however, a deferential standard is better than no standard at all. Cf. Peter 
Margulies, The Travel Ban Decision, Administrative Law, and Judicial Method: Taking Statutory Context 
Seriously, 33 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 159 (2019) (critiquing Trump v. Hawaii as unduly deferential to the exec-
utive branch). Even more recently, in a decision upholding an injunction against the Department of 
Commerce asking a citizenship question on the U.S. Census, the Supreme Court—in an opinion by Chief 
Justice Roberts—cited the “contrived” and pretextual nature of the government’s rationale as the basis for 
its holding. See Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573–76 (2019). 
179. See In re Stupp, 23 F. Cas. 296, 303 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875). 
180. See id. (restating the law on review of findings by a commissioner presiding over an extradition 
request and noting that the commissioner cannot “arbitrarily commit the accused for surrender, without 
any legal evidence”); see also Fallon, Applying the Suspension Clause to Immigration Cases, supra note 
18, at 1098 n.168. The requirement in older entrant cases that deportation be supported by “some evi-
dence” also touches on similar concerns, as a finding unsupported by “some evidence” therefore lacks a 
basis in any evidence. Cf. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, su-
pra note 18, at 1014–15, 1020 (discussing the “some evidence” standard). However, the inquisitorial in-
tegrity approach outlined here does not rely on the “some evidence” standard because that standard blurs 
the difference between the deferential approach in admission cases and the somewhat more probing 
approach appropriate in the entrant context. 
181. Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3 (1915). 
182. Id. at 9. 
183. Id. at 9–10 (contrasting such durable personal features with the “local conditions” relied on by 
the inspector, which might vary with time and place). 
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also cited to another provision of the statute that expressly gave the President 
authority to consider “detriment. . . [to] labor conditions.”184 Under that pro-
vision, the President may categorically deny admission to nationals of any 
country that willfully issues passports to nationals without family ties to the 
United States or skills needed in the labor market and facilitates foreign pass-
port-holders’ passage from a U.S. territory such as Hawaii to the “continental 
territory of the United States.”185 For Holmes, an express grant of power to 
the President of this type suggested that Congress could not have intended to 
grant similar authority to a line-level immigration inspector. 
In extradition cases, the conception of the examining magistrate’s power 
was rooted in the avoidance of plain legal error. A habeas court could review 
the legal issue of whether the conduct alleged in the extradition request con-
stituted an “extraditable crime.”186 Review of this determination ensured that 
the requesting state was not seeking to undermine the integrity of the extradi-
tion process by seeking the return of those who had committed political 
offenses. Insisting that a request describe an extraditable crime also rein-
forced the specialty doctrine, as the state receiving the request could not mon-
itor the actual crime charged after the return of the prisoner to ensure that it 
was identical to the crime cited in the request. To ensure vigilance on this 
score, a court could grant the writ if the commissioner’s decision was “palpa-
bly erroneous” as a legal matter.187 Such occasions were rare because the 
plain error standard was appropriately deferential and magistrates had the in-
dependence necessary to do their jobs. But having the standard in place was a 
useful check as well as a symbol of independent review. 
4. Procedural Rights for Subjects of Proceedings 
Courts have also stressed that in the extradition and transfer contexts, the 
subjects of other states’ requests must offer an array of procedural rights. 
Although review of these requests will not inquire on a granular level about 
every possible procedural error that has or might occur, courts generally seek 
assurance at a systemic level that a fair process is in place. 
184. Id. 
185. See Act of Feb. 20, 1907 (An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the United States), 
ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898. This statute codifies the so-called “Gentlemen’s Agreement,” in which then-presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt agreed with Japan to limit the immigration of low-skilled laborers from Japan 
who had disembarked in Hawaii—then a U.S. territory—and then traveled to California; in exchange, 
Roosevelt committed the U.S. government to ensure that U.S. states such as California did not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause by discriminating in public education against lawful U.S. residents from Japan. 
See Elihu Root, The Real Questions under the Japanese Treaty and the San Francisco School Board 
Resolution, 1 AM. J. INT’L L. 273, 277 (1907) (explaining the agreement; the Secretary of State asserted 
that state segregation of Japanese schoolchildren was unlawful because the state is “forbidden . . . to dis-
criminate”); see also Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law, supra note 158, at 156–58 (describing 
the background and the context of the agreement, including San Francisco’s attempt to bar Japanese chil-
dren from public schools). 
186. See Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502, 509 (1896). 
187. See id. 
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In an early extradition case, Judge Blatchford, who subsequently served on 
the Supreme Court, vacated the order of a commissioner who refused to per-
mit the accused to testify.188 For then-Judge Blatchford, the ability of the 
accused to testify was an important safeguard against arbitrary decisions.189 
Not every procedural request of a petitioner would elicit such a reaction. 
Indeed, Judge Blatchford rejected another argument by the petitioner that the 
commissioner should have adjourned the hearing to allow the petitioner to 
obtain evidence from Switzerland, which had requested the petitioner’s extra-
dition to stand trial on forgery charges. Judge Blatchford noted that the peti-
tioner had not submitted a specific proffer regarding the evidence sought and 
thus had not shown that the evidence existed or was “accessible or. . . likely 
to be obtained.”190 Here, too, the habeas court focused on procedural safe-
guards, although it did not allow the hypothetical availability of exculpatory 
evidence to interfere with the court’s efficient processing of the extradition 
request. 
In subsequent cases involving extradition and transfer, courts have 
expressly noted the accused’s right to question witnesses and gain access to 
evidence. For example, in Wilson v. Girard, the Court upheld the transfer of a 
U.S. service member to Japanese authorities for trial following allegations of 
criminal conduct occurring on Japanese territory.191 In an appendix, the 
Court cited to a Department of Defense affidavit by its General Counsel guar-
anteeing that in the Japanese criminal prosecution, the defendant would have 
a lawyer of his choice paid for by the U.S. government, an interpreter, full in-
formation on the charges, the right to confront all witnesses, compulsory pro-
cess for witnesses on his behalf, and attendance at the trial by a U.S. 
government representative, who would monitor the proceedings and report 
back to U.S. officials.192 While the Court’s per curiam decision rested mainly 
on the age-old principle that a state maintains jurisdiction to try individuals 
for alleged criminal conduct occurring within that state’s territory,193 both the 
nature of the post-war U.S.-Japan relationship and the detail in the Defense 
Department General Counsel’s affidavit suggested strongly that the accused 
would receive baseline procedural rights.194 
188. See In re Farez, 8 F. Cas. 1007, 1011–12 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1870) (asserting that “the prisoner must 
have an opportunity, if he desires, of making his own statement under oath”). 
189. In a subsequent decision, Judge Blatchford questioned whether a habeas court could even 
require a commissioner to permit the accused’s testimony if other competent evidence supported the 
extradition request. See In re Stupp, 23 F. Cas. 296, 300–01 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875). In any case, extradition 
requests always proceed on notice to the accused, who has an opportunity to respond in writing and in 
practice frequently appears before the commissioner. See In re Farez, 8 F. Cas. 1001, 1003 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1869) (recounting the extensive earlier proceedings in Farez’s case). 
190. Farez, 8 F. Cas. at 1013. 
191. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 529–30 (1957). 
192. Id. at 547. 
193. See id. at 529–30. 
194. Language in Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008), indicates that a habeas court in a transfer 
case involving a requesting state’s territorial jurisdiction should not review the requesting state’s proce-
dural rights. See id. at 696 (noting that in cases involving territorial jurisdiction, an otherwise lawful 
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In sum, inquisitorial integrity looks to the presence of an independent deci-
sionmaker, a good-faith judgment, the absence of plain legal error, and fun-
damental fairness. Although this model lacks the rigor of the error-correction 
approach, it does serve the checking function that habeas performs in the con-
stitutional design. 
III. SELECTING THE HABEAS MODEL FOR ADMISSION AND EXPANDED EXPEDITED 
REMOVAL: THE ROLE OF DUE PROCESS BALANCING 
This Part turns to the Supreme Court’s procedural due process test in 
Mathews v. Eldridge to determine which approach—error-correction, nonre-
viewability, or inquisitorial integrity—is appropriate for expedited re-
moval.195 Addressing due process is vital because, as Chief Justice Roberts 
noted in his dissent in Boumediene v. Bush, crafting the contours of habeas 
must entail consideration of “what rights either habeas [or an administrative 
substitute]. . . is supposed to protect.”196 Under Mathews, the Court considers 
the interest of the individual, the interest of the government, and the risk of 
error posed by current procedures.197 Applying this test leads to disparate 
results for expedited removal in admission cases and expanded expedited re-
moval, respectively. In the former case, the more deferential inquisitorial 
transfer or extradition is not vitiated if the requesting state does not provide the same procedural rights 
contained in the U.S. Constitution). Nevertheless, the Munaf Court’s recital of the facts in the case indi-
cates both that compelling evidence supported at least one of the two prosecutions addressed in that case 
and that in the other case, an Iraqi tribunal had vacated the petitioner’s conviction, providing him with a 
new trial. See id. at 681 (describing one petitioner’s capture in a residence with “explosive devices and 
other weapons,” in the company of an Iraqi insurgent and fighters from Jordan); id. at 683–84 (discussing 
the course of earlier proceedings in Iraq regarding the other petitioner). Chief Justice Roberts, writing for 
the Court in Munaf, also cited an earlier case, Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901), in which the Court 
had declined to hold the procedures of a requesting state to the standards of the U.S. Constitution. Munaf, 
553 U.S. at 695–96. However, in Neely, the Court noted that under the relevant statute the requesting state 
had to show probable cause that the accused had committed the crime charged and had to provide the 
accused with a “fair and impartial trial,” albeit one that did not necessarily comply in all particulars with 
U.S. constitutional norms. Neely, 180 U.S. at 123. 
195. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 
196. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 813 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Fallon, 
Applying the Suspension Clause to Immigration Cases, supra note 18, at 1078–79 (arguing that habeas 
derives content from other constitutional provisions, such as Article III and due process). But see 
Neuman, Habeas Corpus and Executive Detention, supra note 18, at 1020–21 (suggesting that the 
Suspension Clause alone is sufficient to support the judicial review of removal decisions, including those 
in admission cases). Under the approach taken in this Article, Congress cannot curb judicial review 
required by the Due Process Clause, regardless of whether Article III of the Constitution, which governs 
federal judicial power, provides a separate check on Congress’s ability to limit such review. See generally 
Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1855) (holding that Congress can 
enact an administrative procedure to remedy federal tax collectors’ refusal to hand over duly collected 
taxes to the government); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 714–15 (1893) (suggest-
ing that the denial of admission can be effected on the sole authority of political branches and that judicial 
review is not required). Cf. Fallon, Applying the Suspension Clause to Immigration Cases, supra note 18, 
at 1080–81 (discussing the “public rights” doctrine that allows Congress to limit judicial review of cases 
involving rights that accrue to the public generally, and the relevance of the doctrine to immigration law). 
In light of this focus on due process, the Article defers discussion of Article III’s independent significance 
to another day. 
197. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35. Along with the risk of error, courts should also consider the value 
of additional safeguards in reducing the risk of error. See id. at 335. 
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integrity standard is appropriate; that standard enhances the recourse of asy-
lum seekers, virtually all of whom have no avenue for review today.198 In the 
latter, the application of Mathews requires the use of the more probing error- 
correction approach, in large part because of U.S. ties developed by foreign 
nationals who have entered the United States and resided here for any period 
under two years. 
A. The Individual’s Interest 
The interest of the individual is a central driver in this Article’s 
approach. With respect to cases involving persecution claims, the individu-
al’s interest in admission supports the rejection of the traditional nonre-
viewability paradigm and the adoption of an inquisitorial integrity 
standard.199 These compelling interests also support this Article’s prescrip-
tion that courts adopt an error-correction standard for review of expanded 
expedited removal determinations. 
In dealing with an asylum seeker, a false negative can result in arbitrary 
arrest, torture, or death.200 The avoidance of these harms to life, liberty, and 
personal safety equals or outweighs mere harm to income or property, which 
may trigger due process protections.201 Nevertheless, the harms associated 
with denying asylum differ from those recognized in existing caselaw. For 
example, compared with the Guantanamo detainees who gained access to ha-
beas in Boumediene v. Bush to secure their release from indefinite wartime 
detention, an asylum seeker denied admission does not necessarily face the 
certainty of harm. An asylum claimant need only show that return to the 
applicant’s home country will engender a “reasonable possibility” of perse-
cution based on one of the five statutory factors.202 Moreover, since the 
United States is not directly causing the possible harm, an applicant denied  
198. Their only chance under the statute is the severely limited remedy found in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e) 
(2)(A)–(C) (2012), under which a petitioner must show that they are a U.S. citizen, who was in fact not or-
dered removed, or who was previously granted a currently valid LPR, refugee, or asylee status. 
199. The inquisitorial integrity standard also dovetails with the “facially legitimate and bona fide” 
standard that the Court has used in immigration cases that affect a U.S. citizen’s constitutional rights, such 
as the right to know under the First Amendment or the right of intimate association with close family 
members seeking admission from abroad. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419 (2018); Kerry v. 
Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 756– 
57 (1972). 
200. See Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After Boumediene v. Bush, supra note 
146, at 576 n. 212 (implying that the interest of “an asylum seeker . . . wrongly denied referral to a credi-
ble fear review” may require heightened protection under Mathews balancing); id. at 577 n.B 213 (noting 
that such individuals may face “death or imprisonment” if the United States removes them to their country 
of origin). 
201. See generally Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340–43 (assuming that the final termination of Social 
Security Disability benefits requires an evidentiary hearing, but that because these benefits are not tied to 
financial need, the preliminary agency termination of benefits does not require a formal pre-deprivation 
evidentiary hearing, although it does require notice to the recipient and a chance to respond). 
202. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987). 
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admission may be able to find safety in a third country.203 An admission can-
didate’s attenuated or nonexistent ties to the United States further diminish 
her equities.204 Even appropriately discounted, however, denial of admission 
clearly increases the risk of serious harm. Under a due process balancing 
analysis that rejects the “privilege, not right” view of admission that drives 
the nonreviewability model, the applicant’s interest is weighty enough to 
require some judicial review beyond the exceedingly narrow parameters that 
the INA sets for expedited removal.205 
If interests of asylum claimants in admission cases have some weight, the 
scale tips further for foreign nationals who are subject to expanded expedited 
removal. As the DHS expansion notice conceded,206 foreign nationals who 
have resided in the United States just short of two years have forged “substan-
tial connections.”207 Those ties may include relationships with U.S. citizen 
friends and families, as well as ongoing duties to comply with U.S. law.208 If 
our legal system imposes the burden of compliance on entrants, it should also 
share the benefits of our signature legal protections, including due process. 
While DHS avowed that its implementation of expedited removal’s expan-
sion will take entrants’ U.S. connections into account,209 an independent 
check would ensure that those connections receive an appropriate level of 
respect. The skeletal judicial review currently available under the expedited 
removal statute does not adequately protect these interests. 
B. State Interest 
The government’s interest also depends on whether the foreign national in 
removal proceedings has entered the country and on the duration of the 
entrant’s stay here. State interest is most weighty in expeditious removal of 
inadmissible foreign nationals apprehended at or near the border or a port of 
entry. In contrast, state interest in removal of entrants who have resided in the 
United States for up to two years is both less acute—because it does 
not directly involve management of border inflows—and tempered by coun-
tervailing factors, such as the welfare of the foreign national’s U.S. citizen 
203. See In re A-G-G-, 25 I & N Dec. 486, 494 (B.I.A. 2011) (discussing the possibility of resettle-
ment in a third country in the context of an applicant’s prior resettlement, which bars eligibility for asy-
lum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi)). 
204. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment did not protect a foreign national located abroad, with no previous ties to the United States, 
from seizure without warrant by U.S. officials who had brought the subject to this country for trial, and 
distinguishing cases that granted constitutional protections to foreign nationals who have “come within 
the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with the country”). 
205. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2)(A)–(C) (2012). 
206. See DHS Expansion Notice, supra note 5, at 12. 
207. Id.; see Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 101–02 (1903) (hold-
ing that due process covers a foreign entrant who has “become . . . a part of . . . [the country’s] popula-
tion”); see also Aleinikoff, supra note 42, at 242 (asserting that certain entrants have accrued “mutual 
obligations” with U.S. citizens due to “a sense of sharing in a common enterprise”). 
208. See Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 101–02. 
209. See DHS Expansion Notice, supra note 5, at 12. 
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dependents. In either category, the government’s interest is systemic. With 
limited resources, the government must both apprehend persons who violate 
immigration laws and adjudicate immigration cases, including applications 
for asylum. Moreover, the government’s interest is both ex post—responding 
to immigration flows that have already occurred—and ex ante: within legal 
constraints, deterring attempts at entry by inadmissible foreign nationals and 
those with manifestly unfounded asylum claims.210 The government’s sys-
temic interest in deterrence requires examination of both “push” and “pull” 
factors shaping immigration flows. 
From a systemic standpoint, an accurate inquisitorial system at the admis-
sion stage serves United States interests. As the Supreme Court reiterated in 
Trump v. Hawaii, “the admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a fun-
damental sovereign attribute.”211 Opting for a full adversarial hearing in 
every case would present significant systemic, logistical and budgetary 
demands.212 
See Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited Removal, supra note 23, at 684–85; see also David A. 
Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 
1268–69 (1990) (suggesting that an unmanageable volume of asylum claims, including a substantial 
cohort of doubtful merit, “gravely threatens the overall structure of deliberate control over immigration— 
control that is highly valued by the public, and by politicians and judges”). A sharp upturn in admission 
asylum claims can overwhelm even the expedited removal process. To alleviate this problem, the Trump 
Administration has come to rely heavily on two practices used to a lesser degree under the Obama 
Administration: (1) “metering,” under which asylum applicants wait in Mexico for an interview with a 
U.S. asylum officer at a port of entry, with only limited slots available each day; and, (2) the “Remain in 
Mexico” policy, otherwise known as the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), which requires that asylum 
seekers wait in Mexico—sometimes for months or longer—for a full U.S. IJ adversarial hearing. Each of 
these policies entails exposure of applicants to unsafe conditions. As a result, each policy is problematic, 
although full discussion of each is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Innovation Law Lab v. 
McAleenan, 924 F.3d 503 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (suggesting that the INA may permit MPP); id. at 
510–11 (Watford, J., concurring) (warning that the MPP will endanger asylum seekers); Stephanie 
Leutert, What “Metering” Really Looks Like in South Texas, LAWFARE (July 17, 2019), https://www. 
lawfareblog.com/what-metering-really-looks-south-texas (describing the risks of the metering approach, 
including subjecting asylum seekers to attacks by gangs). 
Moreover, a turn away from inquisitorial methods would also 
have ex ante feedback effects, increasing the incidence of unauthorized im-
migration and unfounded asylum claims. 
Asylum flows reflect the influence of both push and pull factors. Push fac-
tors include climate change, violence abroad, and economic hardship.213 
See Lorenzen, supra note 24, at 749–54; MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 24, at 5; Roger Cohen, 
‘Here There is Nothing’: Guatemalans Deserve Better Than Jimmy Morales’s Lawlessness and Donald 
Trump’s Posturing, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/10/opinion/border- 
immigration-crisis-guatemala.html (discussing the effects of climate change—including the greater 
difficulty in growing coffee beans, the resulting downturn in agriculture, and the growth in palm oil 
plantations—which have resulted in substantial deforestation, and thus curbed subsistence hunting that 
provided food for families); Stephanie Leutert, How a Struggling Coffee Market Pushes Guatemalans 
North, LAWFARE (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-struggling-coffee-market-pushes- 
guatemalans-north. In an ominous sign, these “push” factors have risen in importance over the last couple 
of years. See also Nick Miroff & Josh Dawsey, Family Crossings Surge at the Border, WASH. POST (Oct. 
An 
210. I use the term “manifestly unfounded” here because asylum seekers may not be able to assess 
their claims before receiving legal advice adequately, and an excessive focus on deterrence may impede 
individuals who turn out to have meritorious claims. Overdeterrence would produce an unacceptable 
increase in false negatives: persons excluded by U.S. immigration law and policy even when they have a 
well-founded fear of persecution based on one of the five statutory grounds. 
211. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418 (2018). 
212.
213.
442 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34:405 
18, 2018) (noting that, in the course of reporting on border crossings, throughout each day, “large groups 
of 100 or more Central American parents and children have been crossing [the border]”); Michael D. 
Shear & Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Migrant Families Would Face Indefinite Detention Under New Trump 
Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/21/us/politics/flores-migrant- 
family-detention.html (quoting Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Kevin McAleenan as asserting 
that, in the ten-month period ending on August 21, a total of 475,000 members of families crossed the 
southwestern border of the United States). 
important pull factor is U.S. immigration law and procedure. As consumers 
of advice, rumor, and self-promotion from smuggling networks,214 prospec-
tive entrants look for openings in U.S. law. More foreign nationals will 
attempt to gain admission to the United States with manifestly unfounded 
asylum claims if U.S. legal rules, along with overburdened immigration 
courts, result in claimants’ release from detention and authorized employ-
ment during multi-year delays in adjudication.215 
See MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 24, at 4 (noting that, “[b]ecause asylum seekers are permitted 
to remain in the United States while their claims are decided—and, if a decision is not reached within 180 
days, are to be granted work authorization—long wait times can create incentives for individuals without 
qualifying claims to apply”; and further explaining that Congress required an asylum applicant seeking a 
work permit to wait 180 days from the date of filing the asylum claim “to prevent the asylum system from 
being used simply to gain employment authorization”); see also Miroff & Dawsey, supra note 213 
(reporting that border crossers in the current ongoing spike in Central American migration “turn them-
selves in” to U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) officers, and after expressing a fear of return to their 
home country, “are typically assigned a court date and released from custody”); Nick Miroff, The Border 
is Tougher to Cross Than Ever. But There’s Still One Way Into America., WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/national/border-asylum-claims/ (noting that, based on 
interactions with families crossing the border, for a person seeking to enter the United States without a 
visa, the “quickest path [is] . . . administrative . . . through the front gates of the country’s immigration 
bureaucracy” by turning oneself in to a CBP officer and claiming asylum). 
This pull factor, in some 
cases, permits the sound preparation of meritorious asylum claims.216 
The DHS’s rule supplanting the settlement in Flores v. Reno by authorizing family detention 
beyond 20 days is also an effort to neutralize a “pull” factor driving unauthorized immigration. See U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS AND HHS ANNOUNCE NEW RULE TO IMPLEMENT THE FLORES 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT; FINAL RULE PUBLISHED TO FULFILL OBLIGATIONS UNDER FLORES 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (2019), available at https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/08/21/dhs-and-hhs- 
announce-new-rule-implement-flores-settlement-agreement (classifying as a “pull” factor the judicial 
extension of a 20-day limit on detention from unaccompanied children to family units upheld by the 
Ninth Circuit in Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2016)); see also Flores v. Barr, 407 F. Supp. 3d 
909, 929 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (granting an injunction against proposed regulations that would authorize the 
detention of families beyond 20 days). Whether loosening limits on family detention is sound law or 
policy also turns on the existence of workable constraints on the duration of detention and conditions in 
detention facilities. See Margaret H. Taylor & Kit Johnson, “Vast Hordes Crowding In Upon Us”: The 
Executive Branch’s Response to Mass Migration and the Legacy of Chae Chan Ping, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 
185, 201–07 (2015) (criticizing the conditions in family detention). A complete discussion of the Flores 
settlement issue is beyond the scope of this Article. 
Describing “pull” factors that help shape the interaction of prospective immigrants and smuggling net-
works is not an effort to demonize the former group. Individuals who seek to enter the United States are 
reacting rationally to the burgeoning “push” factors described above, including violence, climate change, 
and economic hardship. “Push” and “pull” factors interact in diverse ways within the overall population 
of individuals who consider unauthorized emigration to the United States. When “push” factors are strong 
enough, changes to “pull” factors alone may be ineffective. For example, for the cohort of Central 
Americans who have been victims of violence on repeated occasions in their home countries, emigration 
decisions may not be sensitive to changes in U.S. immigration law or procedure. See Jonathan Hiskey et 
But it 
214. See GREENFIELD ET AL., supra note 25, at 10–14; see also Wayne A. Cornelius, Death at the 
Border: Efficacy and Unintended Consequences of U.S. Immigration Control Policy, 27 POPULATION & 
DEV. REV. 661, 667–68 (2001) (describing the expanded role of smugglers, sometimes called “coyotes”); 
see generally Peter Andreas, Illicit Globalization: Myths, Misconceptions, and Historical Lessons, 126 
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al., Leaving the Devil You Know: Crime Victimization, US Deterrence Policy, and the Emigration 
Decision, 53 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 429, 430, 441–42 (2018) (studying Hondurans and El Salvadorans, 
including those in urban areas most likely to be victimized by crime on multiple occasions, while 
acknowledging that Guatemalan emigration decisions may stem more from economic concerns). Even 
with strengthened U.S. enforcement, the need to escape future violence in this group may impel efforts to 
emigrate. Id. A rational response to current immigration trends requires a clear-eyed examination of 
causes and possible remedies. Aid to other countries, assistance with governance reform, and a renewed 
dedication to addressing climate change are three steps that would be effective in addressing “push” fac-
tors. See Jeh Charles Johnson, Trump-era Politics Are Drowning Out Consensus on Immigration. It’s 
Time for Some Straight Talk, WASH. POST (July 6, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ 
2019/07/06/trump-era-politics-are-drowning-out-consensus-immigration-its-time-some-straight-talk/. 
For a larger set of policy prescriptions, see MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 24, at 23–29. 
also drives up the incidence of inadmissible border crossers and compounds 
court backlogs with claims lacking merit.217 The government has an interest 
in reducing these externalities. 
However, the government’s interest in interior removal of entrants is less 
compelling than its interest in limiting unlawful admissions. In admission 
cases, the government can rightly claim that its judgments will craft a first 
line of defense against foreign nationals’ attempts at entry, which recently 
have spiked to unmanageable levels.218 That rationale does not wholly dissi-
pate for entrants who lack legal status. Many people who now reside in 
U.S. interior—and would thus be subjected to expanded expedited removal— 
came into the country in the same unauthorized way that foreign nationals 
arrested at the border try on a daily basis. If the government lacked effective 
means to remove foreign nationals in the interior without lawful status, that 
would be a powerful pull factor enticing more people to seek entry.219 In that 
vein, an effective admission enforcement policy will limit the foreign nation-
als who actually enter the country and move to the nation’s interior. But while 
interior entrants can strain the government’s enforcement efforts, they cannot 
overwhelm them as massed candidates for admission do. Moreover, precisely 
because interior entrants are dispersed among myriad locations, they cannot 
be a rallying point for media, the U.S. public, and transnational players such 
as smuggling networks.220 
Additionally, for interior entrants, countervailing factors curb the govern-
ment’s interests. Properly framed, the government’s interest also includes the 
welfare of U.S. citizens with ties to interior entrants. For example, removal of 
entrants may permanently separate children from parents or cause significant 
217. See Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited Removal, supra note 23, at 684–85. 
218. See Johnson, supra note 215 (noting “high volumes of immigration on our Southern border . . . 
and the tragic overcrowding at holding centers that follows”); Miroff & Dawsey, supra note 213 (discus-
sing the nature and the consequences of current migration flows at the southern border). 
219. See supra notes 214–217 (discussing “pull” factors in the admission context). 
220. On occasion, interior entrants have mobilized effectively, as childhood arrivals did when they 
claimed the name, “Dreamers.” See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 
F.3d 476, 505–10 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that the Trump Administration’s attempted revocation of the 
Obama Administration’s program for Dreamers—Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)— 
violated the Administrative Procedure Act), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019). But mobilization of 
this kind requires great courage and dedication, in part because public mobilization exposes participants 
to removal efforts. The rarity of these attributes makes interior mobilization difficult and also curbs the 
political force of entrants’ presence and example. 
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disruptions in care and custody. Collateral impacts on U.S. citizens do not 
bar interior removals as a matter of law. However, the need to temper those 
disruptions calls for a more deliberative approach to enforcement that clashes 
with expedited removal’s haste. 
C. Risk of Error 
The haste and volume of expedited removal cases creates a risk of false 
negatives, particularly given the severe limits on judicial review. Without ju-
dicial review, an asylum seeker can fall victim to the uneven quality of 
inquisitors among the ranks of asylum officers and IJs. More time to obtain 
legal representation would alleviate this problem.221 Judicial review can help 
reduce error rates through court assessment of adverse credible fear findings. 
It can also enhance accuracy through lengthening the timeline of asylum 
adjudication, which thus creates more opportunities for legal assistance.222 
Because the supply of skilled immigration lawyers is limited and lawyers 
need time to prepare, the tight timelines of expedited removal present a chal-
lenge for the provision of legal representation.223 
See Lindsay M. Harris, Withholding Protection, 50 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 25–27 (2019) 
(discussing barriers to the provision of effective legal representation in expedited removal); Daniel 
Kanstroom, Expedited Removal and Due Process: “A Testing Crucible of Basic Principle” in the Time of 
Trump, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1323, 1356 (2018) (same); Katherine Shattuck, Comment, Expedited 
Removals: Immigration Judge Review and Requests for Reconsideration of Negative Credible Fear 
Determinations, 93 WASH. L. REV. 459, 482–83 (2018) (same); see also Ingrid V. Eagly, Remote 
Adjudication in Immigration, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 933, 985–86 (2015) (discussing the negative impact on 
applicants’ success of courtroom protocols such as televideo hearings that tend to impair applicants’ incli-
nation and ability to secure legal representation); Mazin Sidahmed, ‘It’s Like an Automatic Deportation if 
You Don’t Have a Lawyer’, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/13/opinion/ 
facing-the-injustice-of-immigration-court.html (describing virtues of programs providing counsel to 
respondents in immigration court). 
Without legal assistance, an 
asylum applicant may only have the ability to articulate an inchoate fear of 
returning to her home country. A persuasive asylum claim requires more 
structure, expert judgment, and supporting detail than many applicants can 
muster on their own. Moreover, when a lawyer is present and judicial review 
is available, a claimant can create a record for prevailing on appeal, even if 
the adjudicator making an initial judgment is biased, indifferent, or incompe-
tent. The combination of barriers to legal assistance and limits on judicial 
review spurs abiding concern about errors in expedited removal. 
However, statistics on the expedited removal process indicate that overall 
error rates may not be as high as the above critique would suggest, whatever 
the impact of expedited removal in individual cases. The centerpiece of expe-
dited removal—the asylum officer interview—results in a credible fear  
221. See Manning & Hong, supra note 27, at 679. 
222. The provision of legal assistance need not imperil efficiency. Immigration courts can control 
the timeline of their cases, declining unreasonable requests for continuances. Moreover, as a value, effi-
ciency contemplates some acceptable level of accuracy. A rush to judgment that results in burgeoning 
false negatives clashes with efficiency, as that term is properly understood. 
223.
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finding in almost ninety percent of cases.224 The credible fear finding is a 
ticket out of expedited removal and into a full IJ hearing.225 That statistic sug-
gests that asylum officers as a group are aware of their statutory responsibility 
to minimize false negatives and conduct their interviews accordingly. 
Indeed, when the statistics tell a story about possible false negatives, the cul-
prit is immigration court. Substantially fewer than half of initial credible fear 
findings ultimately result in IJ grants of asylum.226 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW (EOIR), CREDIBLE FEAR 
IN THE U.S. IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 9 (2018), available at https://cis.org/sites/default/files/2018-09/ 
EOIR_Credible%20Fear_USCIS%20Proceedings%20Table.pdf (indicating that in 2016, only 29% of 
initial credible fear findings resulted in IJ asylum grants; the numbers from 2013 to 2018 ranged from 
46% to 26%). 
This statistic may mean 
that many IJs are overzealous gatekeepers.227 Or it may mean that many colo-
rable asylum claims lack enough evidence to prevail at the end of the day.228 
But this statistic demonstrates that asylum officers as a group are appropri-
ately mindful of the need for refugee protection. 
D. Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge Factors 
It is time to apply the Mathews factors to the admissions and expanded 
expedited removal contexts. The institutional integrity approach might 
require a remand to the immigration court prior to issuance of a final removal 
order under facts like those in Thuraissigiam’s case, particularly if the peti-
tioner could show failures of fundamental fairness, such as specific and mate-
rial errors in translation of the claimant’s testimony. In the expanded removal 
setting, the compressed timelines that the statute mandates would trigger 
relief under the error-correction model, paving the way for more extensive 
review in federal court. 
1. Admission 
To analyze the standard of review appropriate in admission cases, it is nec-
essary to consider all three Mathews factors. The government’s interest in 
managing admissions is weighty, but the individual’s interest in avoiding the 
risk of arrest, torture, or death abroad is also significant. The overall risk of 
224. USCIS CREDIBLE FEAR WORKLOAD REPORT SUMMARY FY 2018: TOTAL CASELOAD, supra 
note 30, at 1 (noting that asylum officers found credible fear in 74,677 cases during a 12-month period, 
while finding that the applicant had not established credible fear in only 9,659 cases). 
225. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012). 
226.
227. See Jain, supra note 95, at 287–89. 
228. In a not insignificant cohort of cases, applicants resort to fraud. See Maslenjak v. United States, 
137 S. Ct. 1918, 1923 (2017) (holding that the trial judge had improperly instructed the jury in the defend-
ant’s trial on making false statements to obtain U.S. citizenship; the defendant lied in applying for asylum 
by claiming that her husband tried to avoid being drafted into the Bosnian Serb Army in the early 1990s 
and had endured persecution; when in fact the defendant’s husband had been an officer in a unit responsi-
ble for wartime atrocities); see also Martin, Due Process and Membership, supra note 23, at 184 (noting 
risk of fraud inherent when “the decisionmaker must learn of events in a distant country, as to which few 
witnesses are likely to be available here, other than the applicant himself”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, supra note 82, at 3 (explaining that “asylum officers and immigration judges must make deci-
sions, at times, with little or no documentation to support or refute an applicant’s claim”). 
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error is not as high as some critics of expedited removal claim, but errors in 
individual cases are likely.229 An appropriate habeas standard would reject 
the categorical nonreviewability model that has long dominated admission 
cases, but would also steer clear of a particularized error-correction approach. 
The fundamental fairness required by the inquisitorial integrity standard is a 
reasonable middle ground. 
Fundamental fairness would require a written explanation by IJs.230 A writ-
ten explanation would guard against the possibility of plain legal error, since 
an IJ would have to justify her decision by reference to the applicable legal 
standard. However, the explanation would not have to be exhaustive or need-
lessly detailed. It would serve to demonstrate that the IJ had conducted her 
review with the good faith that inquisitorial integrity requires. The record 
would also have to show that the IJ had ensured adequate interpreter services 
for a claimant who required them. Interpretation is an art, not a science, and 
occasional errors are endemic. However, a pattern of material errors that dis-
torted the claimant’s testimony but failed to elicit corrective action by the IJ 
would be a basis for a remand. Moreover, if the claimant had retained a law-
yer, the IJ would have to allow reasonable participation by the attorney. That 
would not require changing the inquisitorial character of the hearing by ced-
ing all power of inquiry to the legal representative. However, it would require 
the IJ to provide the lawyer with an opportunity to present a brief closing 
statement and submit clarifications on the record.231 
229. Systemic error at the credible fear stage would be low in cases like Thuraissigiam, in which 
U.S. Customs and Border Patrol officers have referred the petitioner for a credible fear interview. See 
Michele A. Pistone & John H. Hoeffner, Rules Are Made to Be Broken: How the Process of Expedited 
Removal Fails Asylum Seekers, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 167, 175–93 (2006) (detailing problems with expe-
dited removal, principally in pre-referral screening by Customs and Border Patrol officers). But a low sys-
temic error rate leaves open the possibility of egregious errors in individual cases, because of the 
variability of asylum officers and IJs, the high volume of cases, and the haste of decisionmaking. See 
Manning & Hong, supra note 27, at 679, 683. 
230. The statute expressly requires a written explanation from the asylum officer, but not from the IJ 
who has reviewed the asylum officer’s decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(II) (2012). The IJ’s ex-
planation could be delivered orally in the course of the hearing, as long as that explanation was recorded 
and could be transcribed if the applicant sought habeas relief. Id. 
231. In dicta, the Third Circuit has suggested that despite the language of the expedited removal stat-
ute limiting review, as-applied review might be available to address a removal decision that did not com-
ply with statutory constraints. See Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 433 n.13 (3d Cir. 
2016) (suggesting that a challenge might be valid in the case of a foreign national who was subjected to 
expedited removal but had, in fact, lived continuously in the United States for at least two years, thus tak-
ing him outside of the provision’s coverage). Especially in the wake of expanded expedited removal, sim-
ilar challenges could arise in which petitioners claim that they submitted incontrovertible evidence of at 
least two years of continuous physical presence in the United States. I do not discuss this issue further, 
because this Article argues that applying expedited removal to any entrant who has established residence 
in the United States—even for fewer than two years—violates the Suspension Clause. But if this argu-
ment were rejected by the courts, the need for some judicial review of an immigrant’s actual time in the 
United States would acquire greater salience. 
In addition, after Castro, the Third Circuit ruled in favor of an as-applied challenge brought by children 
in the Castro case whom the government had subsequently approved for Special Immigrant Juvenile sta-
tus (SIJS) under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). See Osorio-Martinez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 893 F.3d 153, 166– 
68 (3d Cir. 2018). Arguably, the Third Circuit could have resolved this case on statutory grounds, by find-
ing that as SIJS recipients, the petitioners had been paroled into the United States and were thus not sub-
ject to expedited removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h)(1) (2012) (deeming SIJS recipients to be paroled); see 
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In Thuraissigiam, there is evidence that the IJ failed to meet this standard. 
Thuraissigiam alleged that he been severely beaten and abused by agents of 
the Sri Lankan government because he had assisted a politician who, like the 
petitioner, was a member of the Tamil minority in that country.232 The gov-
ernment’s account of the asylum officer interview differs. According to the 
government, the claimant recounted that a group of men had beaten him 
while he worked on his farm, but the claimant stated that he did not recognize 
the men or know why they had attacked him.233 Since the claimant could not 
state what had prompted the attack, the asylum officer found that the claimant 
had failed to show the requisite nexus between the alleged harm and one of 
the five statutory factors.234 As a result, the asylum officer found that the 
claimant did not have a credible fear of persecution based on a protected 
ground.235 The IJ affirmed that finding, in what the Ninth Circuit described as 
a “check-box decision.”236 In his habeas petition, Thuraissigiam asserted that 
the asylum officer had failed to “elicit all relevant and useful information” 
regarding credible fear and failed to consider relevant evidence of harsh con-
ditions in Sri Lanka.237 In addition, the habeas petition alleged that during the 
interview, there were “communication problems” between the officer, 
Thuraissigiam, and the interpreter. Thuraissigiam alleged that similar flaws 
were present during the IJ hearing.238 
An inquisitorial integrity model would result in a remand of this case to 
the IJ for an explanation of the IJ’s decision. If the government’s account of 
the “nexus” issue with the petitioner’s testimony were accurate, the IJ could 
rely on that ground to find a lack of credible fear.239 A habeas court would 
also request a transcript of the IJ hearing, to determine if the “communication 
problems” that the petitioner alleged were material and pervasive, or merely 
minor glitches that played no role in the case. A habeas court would not 
require that either the asylum officer or the IJ expressly consider country con-
ditions, since information about country conditions is widely available and, 
also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II), (B)(iii)(II) (2012) (noting that expedited removal only applies to 
foreign nationals who have not been “admitted or paroled into the United States”). The Third Circuit 
rejected this argument, suggesting that review under the statute only extended to whether a removal order 
had literally been issued. See Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 164–66. However, the court’s reading of the 
statute may have been needlessly narrow. A statutory solution would have avoided the need for a holding 
based on the Suspension Clause. 
232. Thuraissigiam v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2019). 
233. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 19- 
161). 
234. Id. (noting that the asylum officer found that the claimant had not shown a connection between 
the attack and the claimant’s race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular 
social group). 
235. Id. at 11. 
236. Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1101. 
237. Id. at 1102. 
238. See id. 
239. This finding does not necessarily question the applicant’s credibility as a witness; it merely indi-
cates that the applicant’s allegations are legally insufficient to meet the statutory standard. See 8 U.S.C. § 
1225(b)(1)(B)(v) (2012). 
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in any event, an asylum decision hinges on the nexus between the INA’s five 
recognized factors for asylum and a claimant’s specific account of 
persecution.240 
2. Expanded Expedited Removal for Entrants in the United States for 
Less Than Two Years 
Because of the entrant’s heightened interest in preserving her U.S. ties, the 
standard for “expanded” expedited removal must be more rigorous. Here, the 
error-correction model is the appropriate choice.241 A predicate for the error- 
correction model would be a finding that the petitioner had completed entry 
into the United States—whether or not that entry was lawful—and had estab-
lished residence. That finding would be sufficient to trigger full due process 
rights for the entrant. 
The haste and inquisitorial cast of all administrative proceedings under 
expedited removal would be inappropriate for a person entitled to the due 
process owed to entrants.242 A court would then hold that expedited removal 
violated the Suspension Clause as applied to this group. Given that finding, a 
habeas court—which could be a federal district court accustomed to hearing 
testimony and taking evidence—could stand in for the full adversarial pro-
cess that the petitioner would have received in Immigration Court prior to 
expedited removal’s expansion. At this evidentiary proceeding in federal 
court, the petitioner could seek any relief from removal permitted by the 
INA.243 Of course, Congress could restore the system that had been in place 
prior to expedited removal’s expansion. However, if Congress failed to take 
this step, a federal judicial forum would be available to fill the gap. 
CONCLUSION 
Habeas corpus and immigration law have reached an inflection point. 
Under the status quo ante, expedited removal’s truncation of judicial review 
in admission cases was acceptable, given the Supreme Court’s view that 
admission was a privilege, not a right. Moreover, prior administrative limits 
on expedited removal ensured that the process’s bounds remained shy of its 
240. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992). 
241. In Make the Rd. N.Y. v. McAleenan, 405 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2019), Judge Jackson found 
that expanded expedited removal violated the APA. See id. at 101–05. However, Judge Jackson did not 
fully address the extensive indications in the INA that the agency’s expansion of expedited removal to the 
statutory limit was unreviewable. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(I) (2012) (stating that the deci-
sion to expand expedited removal “shall be in the sole and unreviewable discretion” of immigration offi-
cials, and that the scope of expedited removal “may be modified at any time”). Because of these textual 
indications in the statute, the court should have found that the INA provided no basis for awarding plain-
tiffs the relief they sought. The court should then have analyzed plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. 
242. For example, the requirement that IJ review of an asylum officer’s negative credible fear finding 
be held within 7 days would be inconsistent with a proper weighing of the entrant’s interest under 
Mathews. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III) (2012) (noting deadlines). 
243. A petitioner who had entered the United States more than a year earlier would generally be 
ineligible for asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2012). However, the petitioner could seek withhold-
ing of removal or relief under the Convention Against Torture. 
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full statutory scope. That decision allowed the error-correction model of 
appellate review to operate in cases involving entrants. That operating con-
sensus collapsed in response to two recent developments: (1) the Ninth 
Circuit’s holding in Thuraissigiam that expedited removal violates the 
Suspension Clause and (2) the Trump Administration’s expansion of expe-
dited removal to include nationwide coverage of most foreign nationals who 
have been in the United States for less than two years. 
This Article has argued that more judicial review is required in both admis-
sion and entrant cases. That argument first requires a discussion of the contra-
dictions in current models of judicial review. While the Thuraissigiam 
court’s reasoning embraced the error-correction model, the Ninth Circuit 
reached that result through an unduly broad reading of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Boumediene v. Bush on access to habeas for Guantanamo detain-
ees. As Chief Justice Roberts noted in his Boumediene dissent, the decision’s 
disaggregation of habeas from other constitutional rights lacks support both 
in the logic and history of habeas and in the reasoning of Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion, which relied heavily on due process balancing under 
Mathews v. Eldridge. As the weakest link in Justice Kennedy’s opinion, the 
disaggregation of habeas from due process cannot bear the weight that the 
Ninth Circuit placed on this move in Thuraissigiam. 
The nonreviewability model has contradictions of its own. The Supreme 
Court has not applied it consistently, instead recognizing that at least a “cir-
cumscribed judicial inquiry” is appropriate in cases involving the admission 
of foreign nationals, where the case’s outcome will also affect the constitu-
tional rights of U.S. citizens. The Court’s resolution of matters entailing this 
modest inquiry suggests that abandoning nonreviewability would not ensnare 
the courts in excessive intrusion upon the political branches. Moreover, the 
leading cases on nonreviewability—Mezei and Knauff—rest on the shaky 
foundation of rumor, concealment, and colorable perjury. Allowing prece-
dent to seek firmer foundations would serve both the courts and the political 
branches. 
The liabilities of these models—particularly in dealing with admission— 
highlight the virtues of a third model advanced in this Article: inquisitorial in-
tegrity. Inquisitorial integrity captures the Court’s approach to extradition 
and transfer cases, which often deal with the risk of harm similar to harm 
threatened in asylum cases. Moreover, in one early decision, Gegiow v. Uhl, 
in which Justice Holmes wrote for the Court, inquisitorial integrity has al-
ready figured in the admission setting. The model foregoes the rigors of 
error-correction. Instead, it turns on the fundamental fairness of the proceed-
ing, including its independence, good faith, avoidance of plain legal error, 
and preservation of fundamental fairness. 
To determine which model works best in the admission and entrant con-
texts, this Article turned to the Mathews test. Because of the government’s 
sovereign interest in regulating admission, error-correction is too cumbersome 
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a mode of review. Moreover, the overall risk of error in inquisitorial proceed-
ings conducted by trained asylum officers is low enough to make the error- 
correction mode unnecessary, despite the applicant’s interest in protection 
from persecution abroad in the event of her removal. An inquisitorial integrity 
model best reconciles the Mathews factors. 
In contrast, an error-correction model is most appropriate for entrant cases, 
in light of the applicant’s developing U.S. connections. The haste and 
impediments to legal representation that typify expedited removal do not fit 
the applicant’s interest in sustaining those U.S. ties. The inquisitorial integ-
rity model is insufficiently rigorous for entrants, including those who have 
been physically present in the United States for just under two years. As a 
result, courts should hold that the provision of the INA that authorizes 
expanded expedited removal violates the Suspension Clause as applied to 
this group. Absent congressional action to pick up the slack, courts should 
provide evidentiary hearings for entrants via the vehicle of habeas corpus 
itself. 
The consensus that prevailed before Thuraissigiam and expanded expe-
dited removal relied on flawed constitutional analysis. The Ninth Circuit and 
the Trump Administration have, in different ways, highlighted the need for a 
fresh perspective. This Article has sought to build on that opportunity with a 
balanced approach resting on history, practice, and principle.  
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